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NO WAY TO RUN AN “AIRLINE”: SURVIVING AN
AIR AMBULANCE RIDE
HENRY H. PERRITT, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
IF YOU LIVE IN THE UNITED STATES and are involved witha helicopter air ambulance, you are more likely to die or be
crippled than if you are a construction worker, a logger, or a
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L. Cue, he evaluated organizational structures for expanding helicopter support
for law enforcement. He wrote An Arm and a Leg: Paying For Helicopter Air
Ambulances, 2 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 317 (2016), and Medics, Markets, and
Medicare, published in 43 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 37 (2017). He is
familiar with health care policy issues, having written a number of law review
articles on application of ERISA to health care plans and a book on the Clinton
Administration’s health care reform proposal, and having served as Vice-
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care.
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deep-sea fisherman.1 And if you don’t get killed, you well may be
presented with a $45,000 bill for your ride.2
The central problem in healthcare economics is that techno-
logical innovation has rapidly produced an array of life-saving
and life-improving treatments and procedures over the last half-
century that are very expensive.3 Healthcare economics in the
United States are closely regulated to deal with this and other
problems, but aviation’s contribution to the industry gets a
pass.4 The result has been a safety crisis in the industry generally
and a financial crisis for many operators.5
Because the same phenomena that make markets function
poorly for healthcare in general are behind the crises in the he-
licopter emergency medical services (HEMS) industry, the best
way to deal with these twin crises is to level the playing field and
extend the usual healthcare regulatory tools to air ambulances.
In particular, the fiction that air ambulance operations are air-
lines should be abandoned.
This article begins with a description of the healthcare mar-
ketplace, emphasizing the reasons why public policymakers be-
ginning a half-century ago decided that this market needs a
greater degree of government intervention than is customary in
a market economy. It explains how air ambulances fit in the
larger industry framework and then explains how a 2002 adjust-
ment in the reimbursement formula for Medicare resulted in a
threefold increase in the number of air ambulances in a little
over three years. The article also explains why the usual mecha-
nisms that prevent an oversupply of subsidized healthcare ser-
1 See Alan Levin, Expert: Air-Ambulance Crews Among Most Likely to Die, USA TO-
DAY, Feb. 3, 2009, http://usatoday.com/news/nation/2009-02-03-medchopper_N
.htm [https://perma.cc/S7Z3-HN9H].
2 See Bernard F. Diederich, Air Ambulance Resuer or Rescuee?, 62 FED. LAW. 66, 66
(2015); Peter Eavis, Air Ambulances Offer a Lifeline, and Then a Sky-High Bill, N.Y.
TIMES, May 6, 2015, at B1, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/06/business/res-
cued-by-an-air-ambulance-but-stunned-at-the-sky-high-bill.html?_r=o [https://per
ma.cc/8F5X-TYR2].
3 See Corinna Sorenson et al., Medical Technology as a Key Driver of Rising Health
Expenditure: Disentangling the Relationship, CLINICOECONOMICS AND OUTCOMES RES.,
May 29, 2013, at 226, https://www.dovepress.com/medical-technoloy-as-a-key-
driver-of-rising-health-expenditure-disent-peer-reviewed-article-CEOR [https://
perma.cc/Q33K-8YH2].
4 See Bart Elias, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33430, THE SAFETY OF AIR AMBU-
LANCES (2006), at CRS-14; U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IM-
PROVING HEALTH CARE: A DOSE OF COMPETITION (2004), at 4.
5 See Steven R. Pounian & Justin T. Green, Aviation Law; Emergency Helicopter
Safety Crisis, Federal Preemption, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 18, 2008, at 1.
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vices do not operate in the HEMS industry because of a
counterintuitive interpretation of the Airline Deregulation Act
(ADA).
The next part explains why air ambulance operations inher-
ently pose greater safety risks and how the supply glut has inten-
sified those risks. It reviews the Federal Aviation Adminstration’s
(FAA) incomplete effort to reduce these risks through special-
ized safety regulations. The article explains how market forces
will take care of the oversupply if the Medicare formula remains
the same, argues that air ambulances should be subject to the
same state regulation as other healthcare services, and advocates
requiring autopilots and protecting air ambulance pilots from
FAA or employer action when they ask for help.
II. MARKETS AND MEDICINE
Healthcare is an unusual market6 in two respects. First, virtu-
ally all of the revenue received by sellers of healthcare services is
paid, not by the recipients of those services, but by third parties:
private healthcare insurers, the federal government through
Medicare, and states through Medicaid.7 The amount of money
involved is vast, some $3.207 trillion in the United States in
2015,8 constituting about twenty percent of GDP, which was
$17.95 trillion in 2015.9 Third-party payment rebuts the assump-
tion that supply and demand come into balance because of
price elasticity of demand exhibited by buyers.10
Second, the pace of technological innovation over the last
half-century has produced many life-saving and life-improving
treatments that even the richest patient cannot afford.11 Each
new technology, whether a new kind of surgical procedure or a
new pharmaceutical drug, costs more—usually much more—
than its predecessor. Students of healthcare regularly predict
6 See Thomas L. Greaney, Managed Competition, Integrated Delivery Systems and
Antitrust, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1507, 1509–15 (1994) (explaining market failure in
healthcare economics and policy solutions).
7 See id. at 1513–14.
8 Dan Munro, U.S. Healthcare Spending on Track to Hit $10,000 Per Person This
Year, FORBES (Jan. 4, 2015, 6:54 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danmunro/
2015/01/04/u-s-healthcare-spending-on-track-to-hit-10000-per-person-this-year/
#226c3be294c9 [https://perma.cc/AUQ4-QYQ4].
9 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the United States of America from 1990 to 2015 (in
billion U.S. dollars, current), STATISTA, http://www.statista.com/statistics/188105/
annual-gdp-of-the-united-states-since-1990/ [https://perma.cc/6JSE-MD4N].
10 See Greaney, supra note 6, at 1513–14.
11 See id.
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that healthcare expenditures could consume the entire budget
of most developed countries unless public policy restrains the
rate of increase.12 Insurance markets and public policy re-
sponded to meet the funding gap, as Congress enacted Medi-
care and Medicaid in the late 1960s, adding an enormous new
funding source, and creating demand pull pressures that stimu-
lated even more rapid innovation.13 The increase in demand
was driven by Medicare but fueled also by nearly universal em-
ployer-funded private health insurance.14 Before long, health-
care price inflation substantially exceeded inflation in the
economy generally.15
The employer community and federal budget experts realized
something had to be done. There were then, and continue to be
now, calls for greater reliance on market forces. Price elasticity
of demand, if allowed to operate, would eventually eliminate the
over-production problem, they argued. But almost no one was
really willing to eliminate the subsidies and return to a complete
reliance on market forces and private resources. So reformers
began a decade-long process of experimenting with hybrid regu-
latory schemes—ones that continued, and mostly enlarged, the
subsidies while using other mechanisms to ration care and con-
trol costs. Some of them, like certificates of need, imposed di-
rect limitations on new entrants for certain kinds of services.16
Others, like various forms of capitation for physicians and diag-
nostic-related groups (DRGs) for hospitals, sought to harness ec-
onomic self-interest so that healthcare providers would ration
care—or at least not deliver too much of it.17
The health care industry in the United States is consolidat-
ing.18 Sixty percent of acute care hospitals in the United States
12 See generally SOC. SEC. ADVISORY BD., THE UNSUSTAINABLE COST OF HEALTH
CARE (2009), at 1–2, http://ssab.gov/portals/0/documents/TheUnsustainable
CostofHealthCare_508.pdf [https://perma.cc/93NK-Y6QN].
13 See generally Daniel J. Kevles, Medicare, Medicaid, and Pharmaceuticals: The Price
of Innovation, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y. L. & ETHICS 241, 242 (2015).
14 See Donald W. Moran, Whence and Whither Health Insurance? A Revisionist His-
tory, 24 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1415, 1416–20 (2005).
15 See id. at 1417–19.
16 See generally Gerard R. Goulet, Certificate-of-Need Over Hospitals in Rhode Island:
A Forty Year Retrospective, 15 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 127, 129–30 (2010).
17 See generally Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Policing Cost Containment: The Medicare Peer
Review Organization Program, 14 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 483, 483–84 (1991).
18 See David M. Cutler & Fiona Scott Morton, Hospitals, Market Share, and Consol-
idation, 310 JAMA 1964, 1964 (2013), http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/cutler/
files/jsc130008_hospitals_market_share_and_consolidation.pdf [https://perma
.cc/NP68-RZ4R].
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are now part of hospital systems, in which community hospitals
are clustered around a high-tech tertiary care center, often uni-
versity-affiliated.19 More often than in the past, a patient headed
to a nearby community hospital must be transported to an affili-
ated tertiary care facility after an initial diagnostic workup and
stabilization. Constructing a system with a tertiary care hospital
at its hub to which the other members of the system feed pa-
tients is only one strategy.
Consolidation among healthcare providers encourages con-
solidation among healthcare insurers and vice versa as each
seeks to strengthen its negotiating power to determine reim-
bursement levels. Higher reimbursement increases hospital rev-
enue, but it puts pressure on insurance premiums.20
[C]ompanies in both industries [are trying] to gain the scale and
heft to succeed amid changes unleashed or accelerated by the
health law. Those include growing pressures to constrain costs,
and new forms of payment that require providers to meet effi-
ciency and care-quality goals. Health systems are adding hospi-
tals, doctor practices and a range of other services that enable
them to manage all of a patient’s care. And each industry is bulk-
ing up to amass leverage in contract negotiations against the
other.21
According to a 2013 study published in the Journal of the
American Medical Association by a member of the Harvard eco-
nomics faculty and a member of the Yale School of Management
faculty, sixty percent of American hospitals are part of hospital
systems.22 The average hospital system comprises 3.2 hospitals.23
The trend away from freestanding community acute care hospi-
tals and toward coordinated systems has been fueled by dra-
matic improvements in tertiary care treatment technologies,
which are expensive.24 Few hospitals can afford state-of-the-art
capability across a broad range of life-threatening health condi-
tions.25 Significant economies of scale operate when a system is
able to treat lower acuity patients in lower technology commu-
19 See id. at 1965–66.
20 See id. at 1967.
21 Anna Wilde Mathews, Health-Care Providers, Insurers Supersize, WALL ST. J.
(Sep. 21, 2015, 11:46 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/health-care-providers-in-
surers-supersize-1442850400 [https://perma.cc/5RSX-A9NM].
22 See Cutler & Morton, supra note 18, at 1965, Table 1.
23 See id.
24 See id. at 1966.
25 See id.
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nity hospitals and to move higher acuity patients to a single,
high-technology tertiary care system at the center of a hospital
system as necessary.26
In a recent interview, a physician at Johns Hopkins University
explained: “The second thing [about hospital consolidation] is
identifying which hospital will take the lead in certain very spe-
cialized services like heart transplants or liver transplants. You
want one hospital to do it really well, instead of having two do-
ing it ok, each one of them.”27 At the same time, the success of
healthcare reform cost containment efforts has dramatically re-
duced the length of patient stays and thus the traditional reve-
nue base for community hospitals.28 This induces smaller
hospitals to merge into larger systems for access to necessary re-
sources, including capital for improving specialized patient
care.29 Specialization among hospitals increases the need for in-
terfacility transport, which increases demand for air or ground
ambulance service. Consolidation increases the likelihood that
consolidated systems will use their market power to rationalize
the delivery of air ambulance services.
III. REGULATION AND RATIONING
A. GENERALLY
When price elasticity does not blunt demand, some other
mechanism must ration supply. No one likes to use the word
“rationing” when it comes to healthcare policy, but all forms of
healthcare economic regulation represent some kind of ration-
ing. Healthcare cost control strategies typically take one or more
of three forms. First, healthcare providers can be reimbursed
based on a price schedule rather than for their costs or unilat-
eral provider determinations of prices. DRGs and the 2002 air
ambulance fee schedule reflect that approach.30 Second, health-
care providers can be afforded a fixed amount to cover treat-
26 See generally id. at 1969.
27 Interview by Kristin Gourlay with Gerard Anderson, Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity (Oct. 22, 2015), http://ripr.org/post/pulse-how-does-hospital-consolidation-
help-or-hurt-patients [https://perma.cc/KZD6-H6LR].
28 See Cutler & Morton, supra note 18, at 1965–66 (reporting a 33% decline in
hospital days from 1981 to 2011 and a 15% reduction in the number of
hospitals).
29 See id. at 1967.
30 CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS, AMBULENCE FEE SCHEDULE (2006),
https://www.cms.gov/medicare/medicare-fee-for-service-payment/ambulance
feeschedule/index.html [https://perma.cc/9BUH-TKLY].
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ment of a large pool of potential patients. This is the “capitation
approach” used in many managed care insurance schemes.31 A
provider—usually a physician rather than a hospital—contracts
to treat anyone from a defined group for a fixed aggregate pay-
ment over the term of the contract. The third approach fixes an
overall amount available for reimbursement of multiple provid-
ers for certain broad categories of treatment. The level of reim-
bursement for particular instances of treatment must be
adjusted so that the total payments to all providers do not ex-
ceed the overall amount. This approach is used by Medicare in
setting and resetting the annual fee schedule for Helicopter
Emergency Medical Services (HEMS) reimbursement. All three
approaches create economic incentives to control costs and the
frequency and intensity of treatment so that our providers’ total
cost does not exceed the amount available for reimbursement.
The most basic change in healthcare policy, implemented in
the United States beginning in the late 1980s, was to shift from a
cost reimbursement system to a prospective payment system.32
Cost-based reimbursement provided few incentives to control
costs and actually encouraged healthcare providers to use more
costly procedures.33 Prospective payment systems reimburse pre-
determined amounts for specified procedures and conditions,
known as DRGs, discussed above.34 DRGs had a profound effect
on the length of hospital stays, which was its main goal. Hospital
stays fell some thirty percent after DRGs were introduced.35
31 Brent C. James & Gregory P. Poulsen, The Case for Capitation, HARVARD BUS.
REV. (2016), http://www.hbr.org/2016/07/the-case-for-capitation [https://per
ma.cc/2YD9-XFYY].
32 See Nancy De Lew et al., A Layman’s Guide to the U.S. Health Care System, 14
HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 151, 161 (1992), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/ar-
ticles/PMC4193322/pdf/hcfr-14-1-151.pdf [https://perma.cc/FQH8-E8TA].
33 See Judy Sturgeon, DRGs: Still Frustrating After All These Years, 21 FOR THE
RECORD 14, 14 (2009), http://www.fortherecordmag.com/archives/052509p
14.shtml [https://perma.cc/Q3PE-6GTF].
34 See id.; see also AM. HEALTH INFO. MGMT. ASS’N, EVOLUTION OF DRGS (2010
UPDATE) (2010), http://library.ahima.org/doc?oid=106590#.WBInaZMrKgA
[https://perma.cc/5FBF-AQUL].
35 See Katherine L. Kahn et al., A Summary of the Effects of DRG-Based Prospective
Payment System on Quality of Care for Hospitalized Medicare Patients, 2 RAND (1990),
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/notes/2007/N3132.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PHK4-EWLT] (summarizing literature on initial effect of
DRGs and finding a 30% reduction in hospital admissions). See also Cutler &
Morton, supra note 18, at 1965, fig. 1 (showing decline from over 260 million
inpatient days in 1981 to about 180 million in 2011, or a decrease of more than
31%).
90 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [82
This approach has gradually been extended into more areas
of healthcare, mostly applying now to physician reimbursement
as well. The 2002 change in air ambulance reimbursement was
entirely consistent with this emphasis; Medicare replaced a cost-
reimbursement system with a prospective payment system.36
Capping the overall budget for air ambulance reimbursement
had a roughly similar effect to capitation for physician practices.
President Obama’s Affordable Care Act increases the subsi-
dies further and encourages more elaborate private sector net-
works of healthcare providers that regulate the prices within
these networks.37 Air ambulances operate largely outside this
evolving regime because HEMS operators are classified as air-
lines, resulting in preemption by the Airline Deregulation Act
(ADA).38 While the North Carolina health care agency can regu-
late ground ambulances, it cannot regulate their air counter-
parts.39 Medicare sets reimbursement levels for air ambulances
just as it does for other medical services.The Medicare and
Medicaid services agency is constantly adjusting the reimburse-
ment schemes for healthcare generally, trying to address over-
or undersupply when they emerge, but it has largely left the
HEMS industry alone despite fifteen years of oversupply.40
HEMS also largely escapes private regulation by insurance
networks. It does this by steadfastly remaining out of the net-
works and therefore remaining free to engage in balance bill-
ing. The healthcare insurance market also is heavily regulated.
The McCarran Ferguson Act41 preserves to state governments
the power to regulate insurance, and all states have administra-
tive agencies that prescribe coverage, other policy terms,
reserves, and claim procedures.42 But a handful of decided cases
36 See AMBULANCE FEE SCHEDULE, supra note 30.
37 See De Lew et al., supra note 32.
38 See Guidelines for the Use and Availability of Helicopter Emergency Medical Trans-
port (HEMS), U.S. DEP’T OF TRANS., at 4 (Apr. 2015), https://www.ems.gov/pdf/
advancing-ems-systems/Reports-and-Resources/Guidelines_for_Helicopter_
Emergency_Medical_Transport.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8D8-9YSU].
39 See Michael K. Abernethy, Helicopter Emergency Services: A Disparity Between Avi-




41 McCarran Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1011 et seq.
42 See, e.g., ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 50, pt. 1604 (valuation of reserves); ILL. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 50, pt. 2006 (required benefits for emotional and nervous disorders);
ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 50, pt. 2007 (minimum standards for individual policies);
ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 50, pt. 2020 (reimbursement and subrogation); ILL. ADMIN.
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displace McCarran Ferguson state regulation of insurance for
air ambulances, finding it preempted by the ADA.43 So private
regulation through healthcare insurance does not work the
same way for air ambulances as it does for other healthcare insti-
tutions. Insurers are not eager to increase the reimbursement
rate for air ambulances, but they are happy to keep balance bill-
ing,44 because that relieves at least some of the pressure on their
reimbursement rates. They have no reason to want air ambu-
lances to be in-network. Similarly, hospitals do not particularly
want their air ambulance partners to be in their networks be-
cause then they will face pressure to subsidize the air ambulance
operation. If the air ambulance provider is out of network and
engages in balance billing, the hospital knows what its financial
exposure is for air ambulance service and can leave controver-
sies over pricing to others. Federal displacement of state health-
care insurance regulation also permits HEMS operators to
sidestep the growing number of state regulations that prohibit
balance billing for out-of-network services.45
Helicopter air ambulances are but a small part of overall ex-
penditures on healthcare, but their production and consump-
tion reflect the same characteristics as other healthcare sectors.
They thus engender the same controversies and offer public pol-
icy alternatives similar to those confronting healthcare policy
makers more generally.
CODE tit. 50, pt. 2026 (premium increase justification and reporting); ILL. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 50, pt. 2057 (preferred provider plans); ILL. ADMIN. CODE ti.t 50, pt.
5420.110 (prohibiting pre-approval requirements for out-of-network emergency
care).
43 See R. Michael Scarano, Jr. & Bill Bryant, Federal Preemption of State Regulation
Over Air Ambulances, 28 AIR MED. J. 77, 81–83 (Mar. 2009), http://www.airmedi-
caljournal.com/article/S1067-991X(08)00272-1/pdf [https://perma.cc/4J2V-
EMST].
44 See generally Jack Hoadley et al., Balance Billion: How Are States Protecting Con-
sumers from Unexpected Charges?, THE CTR. FOR HEALTH INS. REFORMS, at 3 (2015),
http://www.insurance.pa.gov/Documents/Balance%20Billing/Kevin%20Lucia
.pdf [https://perma.cc/BFU8-G37S].
45 See Michelle Andrews, States Make Laws to Protect Patients from Hidden Medical
Bills, HEALTH, INC. (Jul 15, 2015), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/
2015/07/15/422964973/states-make-laws-to-protect-patients-from-hidden-medi-
cal-bills [https://perma.cc/3GR9-4EYD]; Brooke Murphy, 20 Things to Know
About Balance Billing, BECKER’S HOSPITAL CFO (Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.beck-
ershospitalreview.com/finance/20-things-to-know-about-balance-billing.html
[https://perma.cc/4VSK-F9VY] (no. 10 commenting on controversy over air am-
bulance balance billing, no. 13 reporting that the 2017 budget of the United
States proposes to prohibit balance billing, and no. 14 reporting that a quarter of
states prohibit balance billing).
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The current prevailing business model for HEMS in the United
States is to accept and transport all requests with very little, if any,
inquiry as to medical necessity. Such a practice increases risk ex-
posure for both patients and providers. It is not an uncommon
scenario for a motor vehicle collision (MVC) patient to undergo
a $15,000 helicopter transport followed a $5,000–$7,000 ED
trauma work up (primarily based upon the fact that the patient
arrived by helicopter) only to be discharged to home hours later.
Considering the number of patients who lack any health insur-
ance, this type of treatment can result in financial ruin for some
families.46
B. ARE AIR AAMBULANCES AIRLINES?
The ADA has consistently been interpreted to preempt state
regulation of air ambulance services, which, counterintuitively,
are airline services under the Act.47 Preemption is a central pil-
lar of the ADA.48 Before airline transportation was deregulated
by the Act, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) shared authority
with state authorities over airline market entry, exit, and fares.49
After the statute abolished the CAB and replaced its economic
regulation with a relatively free market, continued state regula-
tion of entry, exit, and fare levels would have interfered with the
statutory goal.50
Most of the cases involving air ambulances involved efforts by
state health regulatory agencies to limit entry by air ambulance
operators, as they do with many other offerings of healthcare. In
Med-Trans Corp. v. Benton,51 for example, the district court de-
scribed North Carolina’s extensive system for regulating health-
care providers. It concluded that requirements that an air
ambulance provider obtain state certification as a healthcare
46 Bryan Bledsoe et al., Can EPs Fix the Helicopter EMS System?, EMERGENCY PHYSI-
CIANS MONTHLY (Dec. 30, 2009), http://epmonthly.com/article/can-eps-fix-the-
helicopter-ems-system/ [https://perma.cc/7FTL-JHAR].
47 State and local governments are also preempted from regulating most as-
pects of aircraft safety and pilot requirements. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Albert J.
Plawinski, One Centimeter Over my Back Yard: Where Does Federal Preemption of State
Drone Regulation Start?, 17 N.C.J.L. & TECH. 307, 330–33 (2015).
48 See Scarano & Bryant, supra note 43, at 77.




51 581 F. Supp. 2d 721, 736 (E.D.N.C. 2008) (citing other state and federal
cases finding preemption), enforced, 591 F. Supp. 2d 812 (Mem.) (E.D.N.C. Oct.
15, 2008).
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provider and a certificate of need before operating in North
Carolina were preempted by the ADA.52
The determinative question in Benton was whether the HEMS
operator was an air carrier:
Here, plaintiff is a federally certified entity that provides air ser-
vices indiscriminately when its service is requested by members of
the public. Plaintiff is compensated for each flight; that such
compensation may come from third parties is irrelevant. The
mere fact that plaintiff does not collect tickets at the boarding
gate does not mean that it is not a common carrier as required by
the federal statute. Because plaintiff falls within the parameters
of the common law definition for a common carrier, and in addi-
tion is certified as an air carrier by the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration, the court finds that it is a common carrier for purposes
of ADA preemption.53
More recently, HEMS operators have taken the position the
ADA also preempts state limitations on private insurance reim-
bursement rates, including those under workers’ compensation
insurance policies.54
IV. THE REIMBURSEMENT “CRISIS”
The HEMS industry claims that Medicare and private insur-
ance reimbursement is falling far short of covering its costs. Ob-
jective assessment of the facts, however, suggests that a major
contributor to the problem is oversupply.
A. REIMBURSEMENT
All HEMS operators get much of their revenue from third-
party payers: Medicare, Medicaid, or private healthcare insurers.
Medicare represents a substantial percentage of HEMS reim-
bursement, while Medicaid represents a much smaller percent-
age.55 In 2015, PHI Air Medical (PHI) received 74% of its air
medical revenue from private insurance, 17% from Medicare,
52 See id. at 736.
53 See id. at 733.
54 Section IV. B of this article considers this possibility.
55 See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMMISSION, MANDATED REPORT: MEDICARE
PAYMENT FOR AMBULANCE SERVICES (2013) at 173 (overall, 35% of ambulance rev-
enue came from Medicare, 40% from private payers, 10% from Medicaid, 10%
from subsidies and charity, and 5% from out-of-pocket payments; not distinguish-
ing ground from air ambulance).
94 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [82
8% from Medicaid, and 1% from self pay.56 It allowed a 65%
reserve for contractual discounts, and 8% for uncompensated
care.57
Medicare reimbursement levels are more important than the
percentage of revenue suggests, because private insurers use
Medicare’s model for reimbursement, usually paying a premium
over the Medicare rate. The starting point to understand the
reimbursement scheme for HEMS, therefore, is to understand
Medicare’s reimbursement for air ambulances. Air ambulance
services58 are specifically listed in the Medicare regulations as a
medical service for which benefits are available,59 but only if “the
service meets the medical necessity[60] and origin and destina-
tion[61] requirements.”62 Both requirements must be certified
by a treating physician—usually a physician affiliated with the




58 For simplicity in expression, this article refers to all helicopter air ambu-
lance services as “HEMS.”
59 See 42 C.F.R § 410.40(b)(7)(2013) (coverage of ambulance services specifi-
cally includes a rotary wing air ambulance); see also 42 C.F.R. § 414.605 (2016)
(“[r]otary wing air ambulance (RW) means transportation by a helicopter that is
certified as an ambulance and such services and supplies as may be medically
necessary”).
60 The rule defines the requirements of medical necessity as follows:
Medicare covers ambulance services, including fixed wing and ro-
tary wing ambulance services, only if they are furnished to a benefi-
ciary whose medical condition is such that other means of
transportation are contraindicated. The beneficiary’s condition
must require both the ambulance transportation itself and the level
of service provided in order for the billed service to be considered
medically necessary. Nonemergency transportation by ambulance is
appropriate if either: the beneficiary is bed-confined, and it is docu-
mented that the beneficiary’s condition is such that other methods
of transportation are contraindicated; or, if his or her medical con-
dition, regardless of bed confinement, is such that transportation
by ambulance is medically required. 42 C.F.R. § 410.40(d)(1)
(2013).
61 The rule defines eligible origins and destinations:
Medicare covers the following ambulance transportation:
(1) From any point of origin to the nearest hospital, CAH [or,
critical access hospital], or SNF [or, skilled nursing facility]
that is capable of furnishing the required level and type of
care for the beneficiary’s illness or injury. The hospital or
CAH must have available the type of physician or physician
specialist needed to treat the beneficiary’s condition.
(2) From a hospital, CAH, or SNF to the beneficiary’s home.
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facility to which HEMS transports.63 The certification is subject
to reversal by the private insurer or by Medicare.64
The Department of Health and Human Services Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services amended the air ambulance re-
imbursement rules in 2002,65 pursuant to a mandate in Section
1834(l) of the Social Security Act.66 The statute required Medi-
care to replace its existing reasonable cost approach with a na-
tionwide prospective payment schedule and obligated Medicare
to write the new rules through negotiated rulemaking.67 It man-
dated cost containment provisions and limited total reimburse-
ment under the new rules to that under the existing
reimbursement formulas, with an inflation factor.68 After imple-
mentation of the new schedule, total reimbursements for any
year could not exceed those for the previous year, increased by
inflation and reduced by a productivity factor.69 Despite the re-
quirement for a national schedule, it authorized Medicare to
provide regional adjustments.70 The fee schedule also must en-
sure that the aggregate amount of payments for ambulance ser-
vices does not increase at a rate greater than the increase in the
consumer price index from year to year.71
The pre-2002 system favored hospital-based HEMS over inde-
pendent HEMS. Both were reimbursed retrospectively based on
actual cost (in the case of hospital systems) or actual prices (in
(3) From a SNF to the nearest supplier of medically necessary
services not available at the SNF where the beneficiary is a
resident, including the return trip.
(4) For a beneficiary who is receiving renal dialysis for treatment
of ESRD [or, end stage renal disease], from the beneficiary’s
home to the nearest facility that furnishes renal dialysis, in-
cluding the return trip.
42 C.F.R. § 410.40(e) (2013).
62 Id. § 410.40(a)(1).
63 See id. § 410.40(d)(2)(ii).
64 See Kaplan ex rel. Estate of Kaplan v. Leavitt, 503 F. Supp. 2d 718, 724
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (denying Medicare reimbursement; opinions of treating physi-
cians about necessity for air ambulance transport not controlling).
65 Medicare Program, Fee Schedule for Payment of Ambulance Services, 67
Fed. Reg. 9100, 9100–01 (Feb. 27, 2002) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 410 and 414).
66 42 U.S.C. § 1395m(l) (2012).
67 Id. § 1395m(l)(1).
68 Id. § 1395m(l)(3)(A).
69 Id. §§ 1395m(l)(3)(B)–(C).
70 Id. § 1395m(l)(2)(C).
71 Id. § 1395m1(l)(3)(B).
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the case of independent systems).72 But “suppliers”—indepen-
dent HEMS—reimbursements were capped, while reimburse-
ment for providers—hospital-based HEMS—were not.73
Additionally, reimbursement data suggests the hospitals were
able to roll in a significant part of non-HEMS costs for their
emergency departments, and perhaps other aspects of over-
head, further inflating their reimbursement.
Medicare benefits are payable to the Medicare covered indi-
vidual receiving medical care. Often, but not always, the Medi-
care beneficiary assigns her benefits to the healthcare
provider,74 who handles the paperwork to apply for reimburse-
ment. The Medicare Act prohibits “balance billing.”75 That
means that if the service is covered by Medicare, the provider
must accept the Medicare payment and cannot collect the re-
mainder of any charge from the patient.76 In other words, if a
Medicare beneficiary uses HEMS and the prescribed rate for the
flight is $12,000, the HEMS provider may not collect the differ-
ence between $12,000 and its usual fee of $20,000.77 Medicare
pays the usual and customary charge for any medical service,78
subject to an elaborate process for determining what is custom-
ary in a particular market area.
72 See Fee Schedule for Payment of Ambulance Services, supra note 65, at 9102
(defining “provider” and “supplier”).
73 See id. at 9131 (explaining differences between provider and supplier reim-
bursement); see also id. at 9103 (summarizing weaknesses of the pre-2002 system).
74 42 U.S.C. § 1395k(a)(1) (2012) (“entitlement to have payment made to him
or on his behalf”).
75 See id. § 1395u(h) (participating physicians and suppliers must agree to ac-
cept Medicare-prescribed payment).
76 Beneficiaries have no legal obligation to make further payment to a provider
or Medicare managed care plan for Part A or Part B cost sharing. Providers who
inappropriately bill QMBs for Medicare cost-sharing are subject to sanctions. See
DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., PROHIBITION ON BALANCE BILLING DUALLY
ELIGIBLE INDIVIDUALS ENROLLED IN THE QUALIFIED MEDICARE BENEFICIARY (QMB)
PROGRAM (2010), at 2, https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-
Learning-Network-MLN/MLNMattersArticles/downloads/SE1128.pdf [https://
perma.cc/KQZ3-V4G2].
77 See generally Fleet v. Air Methods Corp., No. 11–0172–WS–N, 2011 WL
2531048, at *1 (S.D. Ala. June 24, 2011) (declaratory judgment action brought by
employer claiming that the reasonable fee for HEMS transport from a fishing
vessel was less than $10,000, but that Air Methods billed $21,000; dismissing claim
as outside federal question jurisdiction).
78 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395(b)(3)(F) (2012) (providing that reasonable charges
shall be determined on the basis of customary and prevailing charge levels in
effect at the time the service was rendered).
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The 2002 rules mostly adopted the consensus recommenda-
tions of a negotiated rulemaking committee,79 adopting a pro-
spective payment system for helicopter air ambulance services
comprising a base rate and a mileage rate.80 The base rate is
subject to a geographic adjustment based on geographic varia-
tions in private physician practice costs.81 Both the base rate and
the mileage rate are subject to an inflation adjustment based on
the Consumer Price Index (CPI).82 A rural surcharge boosts
both components by 50%.83
The 2002 system treats all HEMS providers the same: hospital-
based, community-based, and public agencies.84 The basic re-
quirements for reimbursement from the pre-2002 system re-
mained unchanged: that HEMS transports be medically
necessary and be to the nearest medical facility adequately
equipped to care for the patient.85 Under the post-2002 rules,
no balance billing is permitted.86 After the 50% premium for
rural HEMS, the 2002 rural base rate was $4,036.44 and the ru-
ral air mileage rate was $26.27 in 2002 dollars,87 or $5315.72 for
79 Fee Schedule for Payment of Ambulance Services, supra note 65, at 9101
(explaining relationship between final rule and negotiated consensus statement).
80 Id. at 9104 (summarizing basic approach of new system: a nationally uniform
base rate, adjusted for geographic differences and a mileage rate).
81 Id. at 9109 (justifying physician practice inflation index as factor to adjust
50% of the air ambulance base rate; labor costs account for about 50% of the
total costs of air ambulance services).
82 Id. at 9125.
83 Id. at 9109–10 (explaining that the 50% rural adjustment applies to both
base rate and all of mileage for air ambulance reimbursement). Here is a sum-
mary of the essentials: “There are just two CPT [or, current procedural terminol-
ogy] codes for air ambulance services: A0431 is the base rate and A0436 is the
mileage rate. Under Medicare’s Ambulance Fee Schedule, the payment rate is
determined by the point of pick-up zip code. There is a 50% add-on to each CPT
code for any patient pick-up that occurs in a zip code designated ‘rural’ by Medi-
care. The payment rates are updated annually by Medicare.” James M. Loughlin,
A Flight of Fancy: Air Ambulance Fee Disputes in Workers’ Comp, WORKCOMPCENTRAL
(July 24, 2015), https://www.workcompcentral.com/columns/show/id/800bf7
2a9ab8a805058833d2c472f9911d9eb0cd [https://perma.cc/J7DN-USGC] (re-
porting on Texas experience).
84 Fee Schedule for Payment of Ambulance Services, supra note 65, at 9109
(new fee schedule applies to all entities that furnish ambulance services, regard-
less of type. “All public or private, for profit or not-for-profit, volunteer, govern-
ment-affiliated, institutionally-affiliated or owned, or wholly independent . . .
however organized”).
85 Id. at 9101 (restating pre-2000 rule for coverage).
86 Id. at 9112 (imposing mandatory assignment, i.e. it prohibits billing patients
for the amount of the supplier fee not covered by the Medicare fee—a practice
known as “balance billing”).
87 Id. at 9122 Table 1(showing rates for rotary wing reimbursement).
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the base rate in 2016 and $34.60 for the mileage rate. At 100
knots average speed, that is a variable cost reimbursement rate
of $346 per hour. The initial rates for 2002 would result in a
total of $5028 for an urban-based HEMS mission and $5767 for
a rural-based HEMS mission, in 2016 dollars.88 Major operators
expect continued downward pressure on Medicare reimburse-
ment rates,89 which is likely to propagate to private insurers.
The impact of the Affordable Care Act may be substantial, but
the nature of the impact is not yet clear.90 The goal is to reduce
the number of uninsured, and increasing the number of HEMS
customers with private insurance will shift the payer mix in a
favorable direction. On the other hand, the Act’s cost control
mandates may cause both Medicare and private insurers to re-
duce reimbursement levels. HEMS community-based providers
charge fees to the patients they carry, but the patients often can-
not, or do not, pay.91 Some HEMS providers write their own in-
surance, guaranteeing “subscribers” that they will not have to
pay out of pocket for emergency transport.92 While this in-
creases the revenue stream for HEMS operators, offsetting bad-
debt expense, it complicates the HEMS dispatch function, be-
cause someone other than the patient usually decides which
HEMS operator to call in accident-extraction situations.93
B. THE PERCEIVED PROBLEM
The HEMS industry claims that reimbursement rates are far
too low to cover actual costs.94 Most private healthcare insurers
88 Id. at 9124 (multiplied by 2.88, representing inflation from 2002 to 2016).
89 PHI 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 56, at 13 (projecting continued down-
ward trends in reimbursement rates by Medicare and private insurance).
90 Id. at 12; see also AIR METHODS CORP., 2015 ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K)
(Feb. 19, 2016), at 5 [hereinafter AIR METHODS 2015 ANNUAL REPORT].
91 Diederich, supra note 2, at 71 (describing lack of advance ability-to-pay de-
terminations, basic liability of patient, and high incidence of inability to pay).
92 Id. (describing subscription service).
93 See Stephen H. Thomas et al., Helicopter Emergency Medical Services in
Oklahoma: An Overview of Current Status and Future Directions, OKLA. STATE DEP’T OF
HEALTH 73 (Apr. 22, 2012), https://www.ok.gov/health2/documents/HEMS%
20OK%20Report%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3ZC-9PWF] (discussing
problem that subscriber programs causes).
94 See Mark Huber, Will the Government Finally Stop Short-Changing HEMS Provid-
ers?, MULTIBRIEFS: EXCLUSIVE (Apr. 2, 2015) http://exclusive.multibriefs.com/
content/will-the-government-finally-stop-short-changing-hems-providers/medi-
cal-allied-healthcare [https://perma.cc/SBU5-22R7] (summarizing industry view
that reimbursement rates must be increased and praising House bill).
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set their benefit schedules in imitation of Medicare.95 Private in-
surers, including workers’ compensation insurers, often link
their reimbursement rates to the Medicare rates, as explained in
Section IV.A of this article.96 Texas is an example: it reimburses
125% of the Medicare rate.97 One commentator reported that
air ambulance fee disputes were the largest category of medical
fee disputes before the Texas workers compensation division in
2015, amounting to 575 active disputes, compared to 292 “pro-
fessional” fee disputes.98
The disputed amount in most cases is the difference between the
air ambulance providers’ billed charges and 125% of the Medi-
care rate. The average disputed amount for the disputes cur-
rently at the division is $28,126.16. Most carriers have reimbursed
air ambulance services at 125% of the Medicare rate pursuant to
the division’s Medical Fee Guideline because it was understood
by most system participants that the fee guideline applies to am-
bulance services.
The average disputed amount will continue to grow as air ambu-
lance providers rapidly increase their charges. One of the largest
commercial air ambulance providers in Texas is PHI Air Medical.
According to the division’s medical bill/payment public use data
files, PHI Air Medical’s base rate increased from $11,492.00 in
2010 to $26,177.00 in 2014, a 128% increase. At the same time,
its mileage rate increased from $150 per mile to $290 per mile,
an increase of 93%.99
Private insurers have their own limitations. Typically, their re-
imbursement rates are higher than the Medicare rates, but most
of them have “utilization review departments.”100 These depart-
ments decide if a claim is payable under whatever limitations the
particular healthcare policy provides.101 Most of them appar-
ently have language similar to the Medicare regulation: the air
95 See generally Jeffrey Clemens & Joshua D. Gottlieb, In the Shadow of a Giant:
Medicare’s Influence on Private Physician Payments, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES.
(Oct. 2013), at 2–3, http://econweb.ucsd.edu/~j1clemens/pdfs/ShadowOfAGi-
ant.pdf [https://perma.cc/B326-TLA9].
96 Id.
97 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 134.203 (2008).
98 Loughlin, supra note 83 (reporting on Texas experience and listing other
states, besides Texas, that link reimbursement to Medicare).
99 Id.
100 See INSTITUTE OF MED., COMM. ON UTILIZATION MGMT. BY THIRD PARTIES,
CONTROLLING COSTS AND CHANGING PATIENT CARE? THE ROLE OF UTILIZATION
MANAGEMENT 169–70 (1989).
101 Id.
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ambulance service must be medically necessary and provide
transportation no farther than to the nearest capable facility.102
If a HEMS customer is not insured and is not covered by
Medicare, the customer is personally liable for the transport
fee.103 Air Methods’ annual report has a fair amount of discus-
sion about the risks it faces with various sources of reimburse-
ment.104 In 2014, $772,695,000 of Air Method’s revenue came
from third-party payers, and $275,677,000 came from self-pay.105
Many individuals who are not covered by Medicare or private
insurance simply default.106 The HEMS provider sues many, but
not all, of them.107 If the provider sues someone who does not
have any money to pay the judgment, it has simply wasted
money on legal fees. Air Methods, for example, has a reserve of
$372,159,000 for uncollectable fees against total charges of
$1,048,372,000 for 2014, or nearly 35%.108 Private insurance
does not necessarily prohibit balance billing.109 So, if a privately
insured person’s insurance does not cover the entire claim, the
person is liable for the remainder.110 This might be different,
however, for “in-network” care. Large health insurers negotiate
arrangements with networks of healthcare providers that limit
what the provider can charge, and these contractual arrange-
ments usually address co-pays and deductibles and limit individ-
ual patient obligation to the benefit levels prescribed in the
policy.111 So it is kind of like Medicare’s prohibition against bal-
ance billing—light.
102 The author’s Blue Cross Blue Shield policy, for example, covers “AMBU-
LANCE TRANSPORTATION . . . [which] means local transportation in a spe-
cially equipped certified vehicle from your home, scene of accident or medical
emergency to a Hospital, between Hospital and Hospital, between Hospital and
Skilled Nursing Facility or from a Skilled Nursing Facility or Hospital to your
home. If there are no facilities in the local area equipped to provide the care
needed, Ambulance Transportation then means the transportation to the closest
facility that can provide the necessary service.”
103 See Eavis, supra note 2.
104 See AIR METHODS 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 90, at 23.
105 See id. at F-17.
106 See Eavis, supra note 2.
107 See id.
108 See AIR METHODS 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 90, at F-5.
109 But see UnitedHealthcare Servs., Inc. v. Asprinio, 16 N.Y.S.3d 139, 150 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2015) (referring to practice by insurers to prohibit balancing billing by
in-network providers and denying claim to limit balance billing by out-of-network
surgeon).
110 See Eavis, supra note 2.
111 See generally Sammy Mack, They Paid How Much? How Negotiated Deals Hide
Health Care’s Cost, NPR: HEALTH INC. (Nov. 15, 2014), http://www.npr.org/sec-
2017] SURVIVING AN AIR AMBULANCE RIDE 101
The current effort by the HEMS industry to increase Medi-
care reimbursement levels is premised on the argument that
Medicare reimbursement levels have not kept up with cost in-
creases.112 In other words, the industry argues that inflation in
HEMS costs has been greater than U.S. inflation generally, as
reflected by the consumer price index. That seems like a com-
pelling argument, except that the major reason for cost in-
creases is overcapacity. Too many HEMS providers have too
many helicopters, and none of them flies enough fully to cover
the fixed costs of their helicopters, bases, and crews at reasona-
ble charges.113
On April 30, 2015, Sen. David Vitter (R-LA) introduced Sen-
ate Bill 1149.114 The text of the bill makes it obvious that it is
favorable to the HEMS industry. Its findings recite that the
“Medicare air ambulance fee schedule has never reflected true
costs”; that inflation adjustments have averaged 2.2 percent per
year; and that costs have grown at a far greater rate.115 It con-
cludes that “balance [must] be restored to the air ambulance fee
schedule to preserve access to timely care for tens of millions of
Americans.”116
The bill would require that Medicare increase the rates by
twenty percent for 2017, and by five percent per year for
2018–2019,117 and that HEMS providers submit certain cost data
after the increases go into effect.118 By July 1, 2019, the Secretary
of Health and Human Services and the Government Accounta-
bility Office must submit reports analyzing the data and recom-
mending reimbursement rate changes.119 The bill is languishing
in the Senate Finance Committee.
tions/health-shots/2014/11/15/364064088/they-paid-how-much-how-negoti-
ated-deals-hide-health-cares-cosst [https://perma.cc/CX6H-JLTH].
112 See Eavis, supra note 2.
113 See id.
114 S. 1149, 114th Cong. (2015).
115 Id. § 1.
116 Id.
117 Illinois Senator Mark Kirk and four others are cosponsors of the bill. They
are all Republicans except for Senatory Michael Bennett of Colorado, who is a
Democrat. Both Colorado Senators are cosponsors, which makes sense given Air
Methods’ Colorado origins. See Cosponsors: S.1149—114th Congress (2015–2016),
CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/1149/
cosponsors [https://perma.cc/PN5V-G7P4].
118 S. 1149 § 2 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1395(m)(1)(16)(D); listing 15 cost
items).
119 Id.
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The HEMS operators are getting more aggressive with respect
to private insurers. A major dispute erupted in Texas, when PHI
and other operators abandoned their historical acceptance of
the 125%-of-Medicare-rate standard for workers’ compensation
reimbursement, established by the state workers’ compensation
division.120 The operators now took the position that the ADA
preempts the division’s reimbursement rates for air ambulance
serves and that the workers compensation carriers were there-
fore obligated to reimburse “fair and reasonable” charges.121
Several hundred consolidated cases went before an administra-
tive law judge of the Texas division in 2005,122 who issued a deci-
sion in late 2015.123 An ironic aspect of the case is that the
HEMS operators challenged the state workers’ compensation di-
vision’s rate as preempted by federal law, while also basing their
claim for higher levels of reimbursement on the same state
law.124
The administrative law judge (ALJ) held that the ADA does
not displace state power to regulate workers compensation reim-
bursement for air ambulances.125 The McCarran Ferguson
Act126 preserves state power to regulate insurance, and that over-
rode a broad interpretation of the ADA, which does not explic-
itly say anything about insurance.127 But the ALJ also held that
the workers’ compensation division had not exercised its author-
ity to set quantitative limits on air ambulance reimbursement; its
125% limit was more general.128 Accordingly, the relevant state
statutory and regulatory provisions were those that required that
reimbursement for air ambulance services be “fair and reasona-
ble.”129 Under the state statute, determination of “fair and rea-
120 See Loughlin, supra note 83.
121 Id.
122 Id. (reporting on litigation, in which he represented the insurance
carriers).
123 See Reimbursement of Air Ambulance Servs. Provided by PHI Air Medical,





126 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2012) (declaring that “silence on the part of the Con-
gress” should not be interpreted as a barrier to state regulation of insurance).
127 See generally Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat.
1722, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (2012).
128 Reimbursement of Air Ambulance Servs. Provided by PHI Air Medical,
supra note 123.
129 Id.
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sonable” must meet several statutory touchstones, including
requirements that the reimbursement level be such as to ensure
the quality of medical care; that they be such as to achieve effec-
tive medical cost control; and that they not exceed the reim-
bursement earned for similar treatment.130
Based on the evidentiary record generated in the proceeding,
the ALJ found that the 125%-of-Medicare-fee preferred by the
insurance carriers would cause PHI to operate at a loss,131 but
that the fees-as-charged approach urged by PHI would cause
Texas to subsidize other PHI operations132 and would not en-
courage cost control.133 The evidence showed that PHI’s re-
quested level would be two to three times the rate actually paid
by 72% of PHI’s other patients.134 The ALJ determined that
149% of the Medicare rate would be fair and reasonable be-
cause it ensured PHI the same level of profit it had earned in
the preceding four years.135 The ALJ also found no evidence
that PHI was inefficient, which would have justified reimbursing
less than that necessary for it to maintain profits.136 The result
was the product of fairly traditional rate litigation: scrutinize
costs, and if they seem to be reasonable, award a rate that en-
sures a particular level of profit.137
In November, 2015, Air Evac filed a civil action against Medi-
cal Mutual of Ohio in Ohio state court.138 The complaint al-
leged that the defendant insurance company was liable for
underpaying claims for HEMS services.139 It asserted breach of
implied contract, quantum meruit, open account, and sought a
130 Id. (summarizing criteria in Texas Labor Code § 413.011).
131 Id. (finding that 125% would have caused losses to PHI for 2010–2013).
132 Id. (justifying 149% as “subsidization neutral”).
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id. (finding that PHI earned a pre-tax profit margin of 9.15% and an after-
tax margin of 5% based on average recovery of 149% of the Medicare reimburse-
ment amount).
136 Id.
137 “Traditional rate-of-return regulation attempts to set rates to give utilities a
reasonable opportunity to recover costs incurred in providing service. The reve-
nue requirement of a utility is set equal to the company’s expenses plus a return
on investment.” Curtis B. Toll, Telecommunications Infrastructure Development in
Pennsylvania: A Prescription for Effective Regulatory Reform, 98 DICK. L. REV. 155, 180
n.45 (1993) (extensively discussing traditional rate-of-return regulation and ex-
ploring alternatives).
138 Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. Med. Mut. of Ohio, CV 15 854950 (Ct. of C.P.,
Cuyahoga Cty., OH, Nov. 25, 2015).
139 Id. ¶ 1.
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declaratory judgment that Medical Mutual was obligated to pay
AirEvac’s billed charges.140
Specifically, the complaint alleged that Medical Mutual re-
fused to pay more than 65% of Air Evac’s typical price of
$20,000 per transport.141 It claimed that Medical Mutual in ef-
fect forced Air Evac to accept the same rates Medical Mutual
negotiated with its in-network hospital-based HEMS provid-
ers.142 It also claimed that Medical Mutual owed $3.5 million for
underpayments over the preceding two years.143 The breach of
implied contract claim was premised on the allegation that Med-
ical Mutual knew of Air Evac’s rates, but still advised its benefi-
ciaries to use the most convenient and accessible air ambulance
services in an emergency, knowing that Air Evac frequently
would be the most convenient and accessible, and knowing Air
Evac rates.144 Thus, the complaint reasoned, an implied contract
arose to pay Air Evac rates.145
The quantum meruit theory argued that Air Evac conferred a
benefit on Medical Mutual and that it would be unjust to allow
Medical Mutual to retain the benefit without compensating Air
Evac for the full value of its services.146 The open account theory
argued that Air Evac and Medical Mutual maintained an ongo-
ing relationship through accounts allowing Medical Mutual to
pay Air Evac’s charges,147 and that Medical Mutual refused to
pay the charges to the open accounts in full.148
The declaratory judgment count sought a judicial determina-
tion that “[t]he ends of justice require a declaratory judgment
issue that Medical Mutual is obligated to pay Air Evac’s billed
charges.”149 The legal theories alleged are recognized, but their
application to the facts is aggressive and ambitious. It is unlikey
140 Id.
141 Id. ¶ 19.
142 Id. ¶ 23.
143 Id. ¶ 27.
144 Id. ¶ 29.
145 Id. ¶ 30.
146 Id. ¶¶ 37–38. Quantum meruit recovery is available only in the absence of a
contract. See Life Care Ambulance, Inc. v. Hosp. Auth. of Gwinnett Cty., 415
S.E.2d 502, 504 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (rejecting quantum meruit claim for 85% of
amount invoiced for air ambulance transport because hospital and HEMS opera-
tor had an express contract for 60% of the invoiced amount; quantum meruit is
available only in the absence of a contract).
147 Air Evac EMS, CV 15 854950, ¶ 41.
148 Id. ¶ 46.
149 Id. ¶ 55.
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that a trial on the merits would result in a judgment in Air
Evac’s favor. In any event, a trial on the merits is unlikely any
time soon. Medical Mutual responded to the complaint, not by
answering it, but by filing a separate action in federal court.150
This complaint argued that the state action is preempted by fed-
eral law, specifically by the ADA and the Employment Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974.151 On February 5, 2016, the
state court stayed the state court action pending resolution of
the federal lawsuit.152
The insurance industry is not taking this lying down. It is
sharply critical of HEMS industry efforts to increase reimburse-
ment. Here is what one insurance lawyer said about the magni-
tude of the dispute:
Phi Air Medical had a base charge in 2014 of $26,177.00 and a
per mile charge of $290. For 2014, Medicare’s rural base pay-
ment rate is $5,167.61 and its rural mileage rate is $33.65. There-
fore, PHI’s billed charges are 507% of Medicare’s rural base
payment rate ($26,177.00/$5,167.61 = 506.56%) and 862% of
Medicare’s rural mileage rate ($290.00/$33.65 = 861.81%).
The comparison to Medicare’s urban rates is even more stagger-
ing. For 2014, Medicare’s urban base payment rate is $3,445.07
and its urban mileage rate is $22.43. Therefore, PHI’s billed
charges are 759.84% of Medicare’s urban base payment rate
($26,177.00/$3,445.07 = 759.84%) and 1,292.91% of Medicare’s
urban mileage rate ($290.00/$22.43 = 1,292.91%).153
C. THE REAL PROBLEM: TOO MANY AIR AMBULANCES
Overall, the evidence and expert analysis suggests that the
2002 reimbursement system has significantly distorted the mar-
ket for HEMS, creating an oversupply of mostly private, for-
profit, community-based services in rural areas. The regulatory
analysis in the 2002 Federal Register notice was prescient in pre-
dicting that the effect of the new system would be to shift reim-
bursement away from hospital-linked HEMS to community-
based suppliers, away from ground ambulances to air ambu-
150 Complaint, Med. Mut. of Ohio v. Air Evac EMS, Inc., No. 1:16-cv-00080
(N.D. Ohio, Jan. 13, 2016).
151 Id. ¶ 1.
152 See Air Evac EMS, CV 15 854950 (granting Medical Mutual’s motion to stay,
docket sheet entry 02/05/2016).
153 Loughlin, supra note 83 (reporting on Texas experience).
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lances, and away from urban areas to rural areas.154 All indepen-
dent analyses agree that the effect of the 2002 fee schedule was
to increase the supply of air ambulance providers.155 It increased
rapidly after the fee schedule went into effect156 and continues
to increase, albeit more slowly.157
HEMS prices have almost tripled in the last five years.158 The
pressure for reimbursement increases is occasioned not so much
by increases in costs, but by excess capacity, which forces each
operator’s utilization rates down and therefore provides fewer
flight hours—revenue hours—over which to spread fixed costs.
To assess the legitimacy of this assertion, one must understand
the basic cost structure of a HEMS operation.
The high proportion of fixed costs makes helicopter utiliza-
tion a critical factor in determining profitability.159 Average costs
per hour or per mission vary depending on how many flight
hours are available to absorb fixed costs. A 2009 feature story on
Air Methods reported an average reimbursement of $7,000 per
flight.160 With a reported average fixed monthly cost of $180,000
154 See Fee Schedule for Payment of Ambulance Services, supra note 65, at 9131
(projecting shifts in relative reimbursement levels).
155 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-907, AIR AMBULANCE EFFECTS
OF INDUSTRY CHANGES ON SERVICES ARE UNCLEAR (2010) [hereinafter 2010 GAO
REPORT] [https://perma.cc/AEB6-AEBW] (concluding that the number of
HEMS helicopters has increased dramatically since implementation of the 2002
fee schedule).
156 See MEDICARE PAYMENT FOR AMBULANCE SERVICES, supra note 55, at 169
(number of air ambulance supplies increased “rapidly” after implementation of
2002 fee schedule “and its add-on payments for air ambulance services to rural
areas”).
157 MEDICARE PAYMENT FOR AMBULANCE SERVICES, supra note 55, at 173 (report-
ing 420 air ambulance suppliers that billed Medicare in 2011, up three percent
from 2008).
158 See Eavis, supra note 2 (reporting an average Air Methods bill of $40,766 in
2014, compared with $17,262 five years earlier; the reference to “prices” in the
text refers to the full price invoiced to a patient).
159 Utilization varies by helicopter industry sector: oil and gas operators report
approximately 850 hours per year, followed by tourism with just under 700 hours
per year. Law enforcement utilization exceeds 600 hours per year. Emergency
medical services, training, firefighting and general-utility utilization approxi-
mates 400–450 hours per year. Corporate operators experienced just over 360
hours per helicopter per year. Honeywell Forecasts Steady Global Helicopter Demand
For Next Five Years, HONEYWELL (Mar. 1, 2015), https://honeywell.com/News/
Pages/Honeywell-Forecasts-Steady-Global-Helicopter-Demand-For-Next-Five-
Years.aspx.
160 Monte Burke, Rescue Helicopters Elevate Profits, FORBES (Oct. 15, 2009, 9:20
PM), http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2009/1102/small-companies-09-air-meth-
ods-rescue-helicopters-elevate-profits.html [https://perma.cc/WLU6-CT4G].
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per base, and a marginal cost of $1,000 per flight (including fuel
and manpower), Air Methods’ breakeven was thirty flights per
month per base to break even.161 Its average162 at the time of the
writing was thirty-five,163 producing an operating profit of 16%
to 17%. This is somewhat less than the 22.8% operating profit
reported for 2014 by Air Methods,164 but more than the 9.6%
profit reported in its 2009 annual report.165
The marginal cost figure of $1,000 is consistent with the ad-
vertised operating cost of an AS350 emergency medical service
(EMS) helicopter, which is a bit on the low side.166 Airbus adver-
tises an independently developed figure of $653.81 for direct
operating cost (fuel, oil, and maintenance).167 That would leave
$346 per hour for crew costs.168
The $180,000 per month fixed costs figure—$2.26 million per
year—is consistent with a base having three $5-million helicop-
ters requiring 10%-per-year debt service: $1,500,000 total fixed
costs for helicopters, and another half-million or so for other
fixed charges. This is roughly consistent with Air Methods 2015
balance sheet and report, which shows sixty-four percent of its
assets in equipment, compared with only four percent in fixed
161 Id. If one inflates these numbers by the compound increase in the CPI from
2009 to 2016 (15.06%) one gets $182,710 fixed cost per base, $1,015 marginal
cost per hour, and $7,105 reimbursement, producing the same 30 hours per
month per base breakeven.
162 The Times story suggests that the figures reported are not those for any
particular base, but for an average base. See Eavis, supra note 2.
163 Burke, supra note 160.
164 AIR METHODS 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 90, at F-30 (reporting oper-
ating profit of $196,959,000 and revenue of $863,867,000 for air medical services
segment in 2014).
165 AIR METHODS CORP., 2009 ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K) (Mar. 5, 2010), at
F-5, http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/816159/000114036110011494/
form10k.htm [https://perma.cc/N9PP-6G5N] (reporting flight revenue of
$486,303,000 and operating income of $47,104,000).
166 2011 Operating Cost Update, CUSTOMER SUPPORT NEWSLETTER (Airbus Heli-
copters, Inc., Grand Prarie, TX), Aug. 2001, at 1 http://airbushelicoptersinc
.com/customer_support/CustomerSupportNewsletters/2011/CSNL_11_V1_I8_
FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/8XEZ-R4M4] (reporting direct operating cost for
various Airbus helicopters, including AS350).
167 Id.
168 $346 per hour equates to $124,560 annually at the 30-hour-per-month
breakeven figure. That would cover a $50,000 salaried pilot, a $40,000 flight
nurse, and a $34,000 paramedic. Those salary figures are substantially on the low
side, but could reflect a salary structure that has a low base rate built into fixed
costs, and flight pay added to it. See Burke, supra note 160.
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facilities,169 and annual charges of general and administrative
expenses as 16.5 percent of total expenses.170 Because all pilot
compensation arises from fixed annual salaries, with a 30-day
layoff-notice requirement, most pilot compensation is fixed
rather than variable171 and should be charged to base overhead,
rather than as a marginal cost. That would result in a higher
gross margin but the same overall bottom line. So the Time mag-
azine figures for Air Methods apparently reflect a simplified, hy-
brid accounting approach, with some crew costs denominated as
variable, and some as fixed.172 It is unlikely that either the fixed
costs or the marginal costs increased at a rate significantly differ-
ent from general inflation during that period. Indeed, a shift
toward smaller helicopters would reduce both fixed and margi-
nal costs. Upgrading to night vision goggles (NVG) and collision
and terrain avoidance systems would increase fixed costs.
Utilization has decreased dramatically in the HEMS sector in
the last few years,173 but some of the larger operators are excep-
tions. PHI’s air medical segment was more profitable in 2015
than in 2014, primarily due to an increased number of flights
and a rate increase.174 PHI reported 35,848 air medical flight
hours in 2015, up from 34,939 hours in 2014.175 It owned 101
HEMS helicopters in 2015, down from 104 in 2014.176 “Patient
transports were 18,768 for the year ended December 31, 2015,
compared to 17,876 for the prior year.”177
The point of all this is to reinforce the intuition that a busi-
ness with high fixed costs, like HEMS, must have a certain level
of output, with each unit of output earning more than its incre-
mental cost, in order to cover its fixed costs and stay in business.
Any HEMS operator with a cost structure similar to that of Air
169 See AIR METHODS 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 90, at F-3 (calculations
based on reported $835,380,000 in flight and ground equipment, $168,725,000
in leased flight equipment, $251,000 in land, and $62,503,000 in buildings).
170 See id. at F-5 (statement of comprehensive income data, showing
$146,391,000 for general and administrative expenses, compared with operating
expenses of $739,439,000, or 16.5% of total expenses).
171 See Air Methods Corp. Collective Bargaining Agreement (Aug. 28, 2014), at
13, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/816159/000114036114034817/
ex10_1.htm [https://perma.cc/4XQX-KGRM].
172 See generally Eavis, supra note 2.
173 Id. (reporting an average of 469 average annual flight hours per HEMS
helicopter in 2013, a 20% decline since 2006 and the lowest number since 1980).
174 See PHI 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 56, at 34.
175 Id. at 32.
176 Id. at 33.
177 Id. at 36.
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Methods not able to fly thirty missions a month would lose
money.178 One able to fly significantly more than that would
make more money and attract capital for expansion.
If reimbursement rates decline relative to incremental costs,
say because of healthcare cost control on the reimbursement
side, or because fuel prices and crew compensation costs in-
crease more than the general rate of inflation, the operator can
maintain profitability only by cutting fixed costs. It can do that
by replacing more expensive helicopters with smaller and less
expensive ones. If an operator with the same simplified cost
structure of Air Methods replaces $5 million helicopters with $2
million ones, it would reduce its fixed cost per base from $2
million to $1.1 million, and its breakeven missions per month
from thirty to about eighteen, holding non-equipment fixed
costs, incremental costs and reimbursement rates constant.179
For any helicopter operation, fixed costs swamp variable costs.
The most significant elements of fixed costs are the helicopters
themselves, physical facilities, insurance, and personnel com-
pensation.180 Expenditures for all of these categories must be
made regardless of how much the helicopters fly. Helicopter
purchase or lease payments are the biggest fixed cost. A basic
single engine, single pilot EMS helicopter costs $1–3 million on
the used market and has a list price of $2–4 million new.181
Twin-engine and two-pilot aircraft cost two-to-four times that.182
An international market exists for these helicopters, so regional
differences in price are not important.
Investment in the helicopter is not completely sunk, because
there is an active used market.183 In addition, various lease ar-
178 The breakeven analysis determines how much revenue must be generated
to cover total costs—fixed and variable—and calculates how many flights are nec-
essary to produce that level of revenue. See Burke, supra note 160.
179 See id. (identifying Air Methods cost structure used as a framework for this
cost-cutting example).
180 See generally AIR METHODS 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 90, at F-5 (list-
ing cost of flight centers, aircraft operations, and general and administrative costs
as three largest components of operating expenses).
181 See generally Robert L. Sumwalt, Current Issues with Air Medical Transportation:
EMS Helicopter Safety, NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD. (May 4, 2011), http://www.ntsb
.gov/news/speeches/rsumwalt/Documents/Sumwalt_050411.pdf (estimating
costs of HEMS aircraft by type) [https://perma.cc/GYU8-NLZP].
182 See id. (estimating high end of HEMS helicopter cost at $12 million for twin-
engine and two-pilot aircraft).
183 See generally Lawrence Leonard, Developing an Air Ambulance Service for a Re-
mote Area of West Texas, 46 J. HEALTHCARE MGMT. 68, 69–70 (2001) (describing
various options for purchasing or leasing HEMS aircraft).
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rangements are available.184 It is rare, however, for any form of
time payment—financing charges or lease charges—to vary with
how much the helicopter actually flies; they are lump-sum or
periodic obligations that are fixed in the lease or financing
agreement.
The next most important fixed cost is insurance, comprising
hull insurance to protect the value of a helicopter, and liability
insurance to protect the enterprise in the event it is subjected to
a civil judgment for damages growing out of an accident. HEMS
has a worse safety record than the helicopter industry generally,
and liability insurance rates are therefore high, approximating
$100,000 to $150,000 per helicopter.
Three factors influence insurance rates. More total flight time
increases rates because of greater exposure. Larger helicopter
capacity increases rates because of the greater likelihood of
more people onboard not employed by the HEMS operator.
The insurer’s subjective impression of the strength of the opera-
tor’s safety culture also affects rates and availability of insurance.
The business model also matters. When everyone on the heli-
copter is employed by the operator, they are all covered by the
workers’ compensation bar, significantly limiting liability for an
accident.185 Conversely, if the medical personnel are employed
by someone else, such as a hospital contracting with the HEMS
operator, exposure is much higher because the medical person-
nel are not covered by the workers’ compensation bar vis-a`-vis
the HEMS operator, and an accident plaintiff can recover
whatever a jury will award.186
The next most important fixed cost is that for ground facili-
ties. Helicopters must be hangared in a space where mainte-
nance can be performed. Ready rooms must be provided for
pilots and other members of the flight crew, who often work
shifts that require them to sleep at the base. Electronic and com-
munications infrastructure must be provided for dispatch opera-
tions, mandated by 14 C.F.R. § 135.619.187 Managerial and
executive personnel and their supporting administrative staff
also require space. A typical HEMS base adequate for three heli-
184 See id.
185 State workers’ compensation statutes bar tort claims for injuries covered by
workers’ compensation. See Alan S. Pierce, Workers’ Compensation: No Longer the
Exclusive Remedy, 2 ANN. 2002 ATLA-CLE 3001 (2002).
186 See AIR METHODS 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 90, at 12.
187 14 C.F.R. § 135.619 (2016).
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copters requires on the order of 10,000 square feet at a monthly
rental of $50,000 to $100,000 per month.188
Maintenance is a hybrid cost. Some aspects of it are fixed;
others vary with flight time. Every helicopter must have an an-
nual inspection, which is a fixed cost because it must be per-
formed regardless of how much the helicopter has flown in the
preceding year.189 Helicopters flown under Part 135—and this
includes all HEMS helicopters—must also have hundred-hour,
and in many cases, more frequent, inspections, the cost of which
varies with flight time, making them a variable cost.190
In addition, many aircraft have life-limited parts, which means
that the part must be replaced after it has flown a certain num-
ber of hours or experienced a certain number of cycles, engine
starts, or takeoffs and landings.191 Maintenance can be provided
by mechanics who are employees, and thus paid regardless of
how much work they perform, or it can be contracted for, which
makes the cost variable, depending, at least to a significant ex-
tent, on how much work is done. Aircraft maintenance opera-
tions, even the smallest, must maintain a certain inventory of
parts or “spares.”192 Infrequently replaced parts are unlikely to
be held in inventory because most manufacturer service opera-
tions provide overnight delivery on regularly used parts.
Whatever parts are maintained in inventory constitute a fixed
cost.
Compensation for aircrews presents strategic opportunities
for different pay structures. Pilots can be salaried employees—
and usually are with larger HEMS operators—where they often
are covered by collective bargaining agreements. They get paid
an annual salary, regardless of how much they fly, but often are
entitled to overtime payment as well. Most receive benefits, at
least personal days off, vacation, and sick leave and, in about
half of the industry, healthcare benefits. A common rule of
thumb for payroll taxes and benefits is 35% of base
compensation.
188 See HANGARTRADER, http://www.hangartrader.com/final/search.php
[https://perma.cc/N422-9PLG] (reporting sale and lease prices for hangars of
assorted sizes).
189 14 C.F.R. § 135.73 (2016).
190 Id.
191 See 14 C.F.R. § 43.10 (2016).
192 See Fed. Aviation Admin. Inventory Mgmt. Guide (2012), at 3–2, https://
www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/order/4600.27B_Inventory_Mgmt_Guide
.pdf [https://perma.cc/7EPK-H6BH].
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Even for salaried pilots, however, their employment agree-
ments, whether collectively bargained or individual, usually pro-
vide for termination or layoff on thirty days’ notice. Thus, an
operator experiencing a downturn in volume and expecting it
to continue can reduce its compensation costs through layoffs.
Operators may be reluctant to do this, however, because the
market for pilot is expected to tighten in favor of applicants over
the next decade or so, and training costs for EMS pilots are
much higher than they are for helicopter pilots in other parts of
the industry. If an operator lays off a pilot, he may have trouble
finding an equally qualified replacement when business picks up
again and will have to incur training costs for the new hire.
A HEMS operator must have enough pilots to support a 24/7
operation.193 FAA restrictions on pilot flight and duty time194 set
a floor for the complement necessary to staff one helicopter—
typically six pilots for one helicopter, three per twenty-four
hours, plus a 10% factor for vacations and sick leave.195 Multi
base operators often have relief pilots who are available to travel
to cover shorter vacancies.
The alternative to salaried pilots is contract pilots. Contract
pilots are paid only when they are called out and fly. A typical
contract arrangement comprises a fixed component for the call
out or on-call time and a separate component for flight time.
Short-term contract pilots are unlikely to be feasible for HEMS
operators, because of the unpredictability and the quick-re-
sponse requirements of HEMS callouts.
Economists like to say that “all costs are variable in the long
run.” This is true because any of the fixed cost items can be
eliminated by a HEMS operator’s adjusting to lower-than-ex-
pected demand. It can sell or lease its helicopters; it can it can
dispose of a hangar and offices; it can lay off its salaried employ-
ees. But these adjustments cannot be made on a day-to-day basis
and most cannot be made on a month-to-month basis, meaning
193 See COMM’N ON ACCREDITATION OF MED. TRANSP. SYS., TENTH EDITION AC-
CREDITATION STANDARDS 5.3 (10th ed. 2015), http://www.camts.org/10th_Edi
tion_Standards_For_Website.pdf [https://perma.cc/WJ5A-BC8W] (requiring
four salaried pilots per helicopter).
194 See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. § 91.1059.
195 See generally Charlotte Adams, Top 10 HEMS Providers, ROTOR & WING INT’L
(Oct. 1, 2010), http://www.rotorandwing.com/2010/10/01/top-10-hems-provid-
ers/ [https://perma.cc/5L5B-23G5] (describing fleet sizes and crew ratios for
the top 10 HEMS providers).
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that an operator is stuck with a certain fixed cost structure in the
short to medium term.
V. HOW THE ECONOMICS UNDERMINE SAFETY
A. AIR AMBULANCE OPERATIONS INHERENTLY POSE RISKS
1. Risks
Helicopter flying is a risky business, and HEMS flying espe-
cially so.196
Helicopter air ambulance accidents reached historic levels dur-
ing the years from 2003 through 2008 . . . . Helicopter air ambu-
lances operate under unique conditions. Their flights are often
time sensitive, which puts pressure on the pilots. Helicopter air
ambulances fly at low altitudes and under varied weather condi-
tions. They must often land at unfamiliar, remote, or unim-
proved sites with hazards like trees, buildings, towers, wires, and
uneven terrain.197
In 2011, National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) mem-
ber Robert Sumwalt made a presentation that concluded with a
slide showing accident fatality statistics, on which HEMS flying
was ranked as the most dangerous occupation in the United
States, ahead of fishing, logging, structural iron and steel work,
and coal mining.198 He recommended that the FAA require
HEMS helicopters to be equipped with terrain warning systems,
that they use NVGs, and that they utilize autopilots for single-
pilot operation.199 He also recommended that hospitals impose
these requirements in their HEMS contracts.200
196 Ira Blumen, An Analysis of HEMS Accidents and Accident Rates, NAT’L TRANSP.
SAFETY BD. 2 (Feb. 2009), http://www.ntsb.gov/news/events/Documents/NTSB-
2009-8a-Blumen-revised-final-version.pdf [https://perma.cc/77GR-H95N] [here-
inafter NTSB Blumen Report] (reporting HEMS accident rates nearly double that
of other Part 135 operations).
197 Fed. Aviation Admin., 14 C.F.R. Parts 91, 120, and 135 Helicopter Air Am-
bulance, Commercial Helicopter, and Part 91 Helicopter Operations, 79 Fed.
Reg. 9931, 9935 (Feb. 21, 2014) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 91, 120, 135)
[hereinafter Final HEMS Rule].
198 Robert Sumwalt, Current Issues with Air Medical Transportation: EMS Heli-
copter Safety 29 (Power Point slide presentation May 4, 2011), http://www.ntsb
.gov/news/speeches/rsumwalt/Documents/Sumwalt_050411.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/FH8X-J4WZ] [hereinafter Sumwalt Presentation].
199 Id. at 18 (recommending that the FAA require helicopter terrain avoidance
warning systems (HTAWS), use of NVG, autopilot if second pilot is not available).
200 Id. at 28 (recommending that HEMS contracts require “that pilots must be
trained and helicopters equipped per NTSB recommendations”).
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In 2014, the FAA identified four common factors in HEMS
accidents: “inadvertent flight into [instrument meteorological
conditions (IMC)], loss of control, controlled flight into terrain
(which includes mountains, ground, water, and man-made ob-
stacles), and night conditions.”201
Helicopter engines rarely fail in flight, but when they do, the
pilot must act quickly to ensure a safe landing. In a single-en-
gine helicopter, the pilot must detect an engine failure instantly,
because he has only about two seconds to lower the collective202
to flatten blade pitch, while pulling back on the cyclic203 to in-
crease the flow of air upward through the rotor.204 If he does
both timely, the upward flow of air through the rotor continues
to spin it despite the loss of engine torque, and the pilot can fly
the helicopter in a steep glide to a safe landing. If the pilot fails
to react quickly enough or correctly, the drag on the rotor will
reduce its revolutions per minute (RPM) below the point at
which autorotation as possible, and the helicopter will simply
fall from the sky, without the possibility of recovery.205
Moreover, the steep angle of descent in an autorotation
means that he can land in a very small space—a parking lot or a
small athletic field—if the pilot effectively and precisely man-
ages the finite amount of kinetic energy produced by the de-
scent’s causing air to flow upward through rotor.206 The steep
descent also means, however, that a helicopter flown at typical
heights above the ground, at 1,000 feet, for example, must be
landed within about a quarter mile radius of the point at which
201 Helicopter Air Ambulance, Commercial Helicopter, and Part 91 Helicopter
Operations, 79 Fed. Reg. at 9935.
202 The collective stick is one of the main controls in a helicopter. It controls
the pitch and therefore the lift of the main rotor blades. The pilot pulls up on
the collective to increase blade pitch symmetrically and lowers it to reduce, or
flatten, blade pitch. See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., NO. FAA-H-




203 The cyclic stick is the second main control on a helicopter. It changes main
rotor blade pitch asymmetrically. The pilot moves it forward to pitch the nose
down, to move forward, and backward, to pitch the nose up, to slow down. Id. at
3-3.
204 In powered flight, the rotor blades pull air down through the rotor disc. See
id. at 1-2.
205 Id. at 11-2.
206 See id.
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the engine fails. In a congested area there may not be many
athletic fields or parking lots within that radius.207
A helicopter must descend in order to develop the upward
flow of air that results in an autorotation.208 If it is too close to
the ground when an engine fails, it does not have enough room
to descend to develop an autorotation before it hits the
ground.209 Even at a greater height, if it is in a hover or is flying
slowly, the pilot may not have enough time to develop the requi-
site forward speed for an acceptable glide ratio. Those two reali-
ties have caused the FAA to require every manufacturer to
establish a “height velocity diagram” (HV diagram) as a part of
the certification process for each model of helicopter.210 The
HV diagram portrays an area of high risk where the combina-
tion of airspeed and height above the ground is unlikely to per-
mit a successful autorotation to be established, typically, at
speeds below forty knots and heights below 500 feet above
ground level. Faster and higher reduces the risk because greater
speed provides more kinetic energy to be translated into rotor
RPM and greater height gives more time to establish and to
manage the autorotation.211
The high-risk area of the HV diagram is not a prohibited
flight regime. It is a cautionary area, not a flight limitation.212
Pilots should construct their mission profiles so that they mini-
mize flights at lower speeds close to the ground. That is why
routine helicopter takeoffs are not straight up, but stay close to
the ground until airspeed speed greater than forty knots is ob-
tained, and landing approaches are at an angle instead of com-
ing straight down.213
Many HEMS missions, especially confined-area accident vic-
tim extraction require flying in the cautionary area of the HV
diagram. For this reason, many HEMS operators prefer twin-en-
gine helicopters to limit exposure to a potentially unrecoverable
engine-failure scenario.
207 See id. at 10-9–10-10 (discussing confined landing areas).
208 See id. at 11-2.
209 This possibility depends on rotor design. Heavier rotors, with greater mo-
ments of inertia, continue to develop lift longer after an engine failure. See id. at
11-15.
210 See 14 C.F.R. § 27.87 (2016).
211 HELICOPTER FLYING HANDBOOK, supra note 202, at 11-2, 11-8.
212 Id. at 11-8–11-9.
213 See id.
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The single most common cause of fatal HEMS accidents is
unplanned entry into instrument meteorological conditions
(IMC).214 Weather accounts for some twenty percent of HEMS
accidents.215 HEMS flights take place under two distinct regula-
tory regimes: under visual flight rules (VFR) and under instru-
ment flight rules (IFR).216 VFR relies on a pilot being able to see
obstacles and other aircraft in time to take appropriate action to
avoid them (the “see and avoid” philosophy). When rain, snow,
or other meteorological conditions obscure visibility, implemen-
tation of the see and avoid philosophy is not possible. When the
cloud deck (the ceiling) is too close to the ground, the same
problem is likely because the pilot may have to enter the cloud
to avoid obstacles. Accordingly, pilots can fly VFR only when
prescribed cloud bases and visibility limits are satisfied, down to
two statute miles and 800 feet above the ground for HEMS
flights.217
On March 26, 2016, shortly after midnight, an AS350 HEMS
helicopter operated by Metro Aviation for Haynes Life Flight
crashed in south Alabama. The accident killed the pilot, the
flight nurse, the flight paramedic, and the patient, the victim of
an automobile accident.218
When VFR criteria are not met, or when in IMC, a pilot can
fly in controlled airspace only when he has an IFR clearance
from air traffic control (ATC).219 An IFR clearance specifies ex-
act times, altitudes, and routes of flight to maintain traffic sepa-
214 Patrick Veillette, How to Develop Helicopter-Centric IFR, AVIATION WK. (Jan. 29,
2016), http://aviationweek.com/bca/how-develop-helicopter-centric-ifr [https:/
/perma.cc/J99S-AD9N].
215 NTSB Blumen Report, supra note 196, at 16 (reporting that weather ac-
counted for nineteen percent of all HEMS accidents).
216 See 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.55–.159 (2016) (VFR); id. §§ 91.167–.193 (IFR).
217 14 C.F.R. § 91.155 (establishing basic VFR weather minimums); id.
§ 135.609 (establishing VFR minima for HEMS operations, including 800-foot
ceiling and two miles visibility for non-mountainous, local flying areas in the day-
time, with higher minima for mountainous and non-local areas and for night
operations).
218 Ebony Davis, More Details Released of Fatal Medical Helicopter Crash, DOTHAN
EAGLE (Mar. 27, 2016, 7:22 PM), http://www.dothaneagle.com/news/local/
more-details-released-of-fatal-medical-helicopter-crash/article_223f23ba-f47b-
11e5-8fe9-a7d86658431d.html [https://perma.cc/XX9J-AEUQ].
219 An ATC clearance is not required in Class G airspace. 14 C.F.R. § 91.173
(requiring ATC clearance for IFR flight in controlled airspace); 14 C.F.R.
§ 91.179(b) (prescribing cruising altitudes for IFR flight in uncontrolled air-
space). See 14 C.F.R. § 1.1, note to definition of controlled airspace (“Controlled
airspace is a generic term that covers Class A, Class B, Class C, Class D, and Class
E airspace.”).
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ration and typically involves radar contact between the aircraft
and ATC.220 To fly safely in IMC, the aircraft must be equipped
with additional instrumentation that allows the pilot to maintain
the altitude of the aircraft and to navigate by referring to the
instruments, without any outside reference to know whether he
is upside down, right side up, going north or east.221
To be qualified legally to fly IFR, pilots must be instrument
rated and flying an aircraft model that is certificated to fly
IFR.222 Many HEMS pilots are instrument rated (often that is a
hiring criterion), but most single-engine HEMS helicopters are
not certificated for IFR flight because most of them do not have
autopilots or require two pilots.223 Twin-engine helicopters are
more likely to meet these requirements. “ ‘It isn’t two engines
that bring me comfort, [rather] it’s the ability to fly IFR.’
Weather, not engine reliability, is the greater concern.”224
Every pilot knows not to fly into IMC in a helicopter that is
not certificated for IFR. But accident statistics show that inadver-
tent entry into IMC (IIMC) is altogether too common.225
A sudden snow shower or rain shower can eclipse visibility. At
night, a pilot may fly into a cloud without realizing it. When that
happens, maintaining control of the aircraft is unlikely unless
the pilot is instrument-rated and proficient. Successful exit from
IMC requires a high level of proficiency. One test by the Los
Angeles Police Department showed that 80% of its experienced
helicopter pilots lost control of the helicopter within thirty
seconds of entering simulated IMC.226
220 See Air Ambulance and Commercial Helicopter Operations, Part 91 Heli-
copter Operations, and Part 135 Aircraft Operations; Safety Initiatives and Mis-
cellaneous Amendments, 75 Fed. Reg. 62,640, 62,651 (proposed Oct. 12, 2010)
(to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 1, 91, 120, 135).
221 See HELICOPTER FLYING HANDBOOK, supra note 202, at 12-4 (“continuing VFR
flight in IMC is often fatal”).
222 See Air Ambulance and Commercial Helicopter Operations, Part 91 Heli-
copter Operations, and Part 135 Aircraft Operations; Safety Initiatives and Mis-
cellaneous Amendments, 75 Fed. Reg. at 62,671–72.
223 See Helicopter Air Ambulance, Commercial Helicopter, and Part 91 Heli-
copter Operations, 79 Fed. Reg. 9932, 9946 (Feb. 21, 2014) (to be codified at 14
C.F.R. pts. 91, 120, 135) (discussing autopilot or two-pilot requirements of 14
C.F.R. §§ 135.101 and 135.105).
224 Veillette, How to Develop Helicopter-Centric IFR, supra note 214 (quoting
HEMS pilots).
225 Id. (analyzing NASA voluntary incident reports that involved loss of control
from IIMC, with seventy-five percent of such incidents occurring at night).
226 See Richard Weber & Bryan Smith, Inadvertent Instrument Meteorological Condi-
tions, INT’L HELICOPTER SAFETY TEAM 30, http://www.ihst.org/Portals/54/IHSS/
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IIMC is insidious, and so are the psychological forces that
cause accidents related to it. Every helicopter pilot knows that
most IIMC is not a whiteout or a blackout; he still has some visi-
bility in almost all rain showers or snow showers. So that makes
it easy to rationalize that he can handle deteriorating weather
and will fly out of it. And then it gets worse. The worst scenario
is ground fog. It is, by definition, near the ground. If you are in
it, you are also among a tangle of wires, trees, and other obsta-
cles. It changes rapidly. Flying into a cloud at 2,000 feet is a
piece a cake by comparison.227
The pilot knows to do the four Cs,228 but then he sees a light
on the ground and decides he is going to be able to land. The
problem is that the light may not be what he thinks it is, and he
does not know what is above it or around it. He fixates on the
light and shifts reference outside the cockpit instead of keeping
it on the gauges. The army calls it “target fixation.” “You do that,
and it’s going to bite you. It takes you back to seat-of-the-pants
flying instead of relying on the instruments.”229
Even when the helicopter is not certificated for IMC flight, an
instrument-rated pilot is more likely to handle IIMC safely:
[T]he FAA found that inadvertent flight into IMC is a common
factor in helicopter air ambulance accidents. In general, many
accidents result when pilots who lack the necessary skills or
equipment to fly in marginal VMC or IMC attempt flight without
outside references. This proposal is intended to ensure that heli-
copter air ambulance pilots are equipped to handle these situa-
tions and extract themselves from these dangerous situations. A
pilot who receives the more extensive training on navigating a
helicopter solely by reference to instruments provided by ob-
taining an instrument rating is better able to maintain situational
awareness and maneuver the helicopter into a safe environment
than a pilot without an instrument rating.230
2014/The%20IIMC%20Threat%20-%20Avoidance%20and%20Survival.pdf
[https://perma.cc/75HL-XXHM] (slide presentation summarizing accidents
and simulator results).
227 See id. at 33, 40.
228 See HELICOPTER FLYING HANDBOOK, supra note 202, at 11-23 (discussing the
four Cs).
229 The author conducted a confidential telephone interview with a HEMS Pi-
lot on March 29, 2016.
230 Air Ambulance and Commercial Helicopter Operations, Part 91 Helicopter
Operations, and Part 135 Aircraft Operations; Safety Initiatives and Miscellane-
ous Amendments, 75 Fed. Reg. 62,640, 62,656 (proposed Oct. 12, 2010) (to be
codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 1, 91, 120, 135).
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But IFR capability is not a silver bullet. For IFR to be broadly
useful in HEMS, the helicopter must operate from landing areas
that have published IFR approach procedures. That is not gen-
erally the case with helipads, and it certainly is not the case with
accident or acute-illness scenes.231 While some hospitals and
other heliport operators may elect to work with the FAA to de-
velop approach and departure procedures for helipads, the pro-
cess requires significant investment.
The Federal Aviation Rules (FARs) permit landings at and de-
partures in IMC to be made only by use of published approach
or departure procedures. Establishing an approach or depar-
ture approach procedure is a demanding process that requires
detailed engineering calculations of runway length, height
above sea level, nearby obstacles, aircraft approach speeds, rates
of dissent, and rates of climb.232
The wider use a global positioning system (GPS) for all forms
of air navigation and the relatively recent deployment of
autopilots and other automation on helicopters has led the FAA
to allow new types of procedures designed for helicopters from
the outset.233 Because helicopters can fly slower than airplanes
and are more maneuverable even at low speeds, they can avoid
obstacles and other aircraft in lower flight visibilities and can fly
steeper approach angles and make more aggressive turns at low
231 See id. at 62,660 (“The FAA understands that aircraft are configured differ-
ently and instrument approaches may not be readily available in all places where
helicopters operate”).
232 Hickok & Associates, Inc. develops and publishes “Point in Space” proce-
dures (PinS) under FAA approved guidance. See Helicopter Instrument Approach and
Departure Charts, HICKOK & ASSOCIATES, INC., http://hickokgpsifr.com/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2016/01/Charting-Legend-Revision-21.pdf [https://perma.cc/
B5CN-CNTH] [hereinafter Hickok Chart]. As Hickok develops new procedures, it
uploads them to an FAA database, from which the FAA reviews and approves
them. Company Flyer, HICKOK & ASSOCIATES, INC., http://hickokgpsifr.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/Tri-Fold.pdf [https://perma.cc/F3EY-TAVJ] (“At
Hickok & Associates, we build and coordinate helicopter airspace systems, some-
times covering entire states, to provide approach, departure, and enroute capa-
bilities. Our en route segments are typically hundreds of feet lower than the
traditional Minimum Instrument Altitude (MIA) or Minimum Vector Altitude
(MVA) that ATC would otherwise have to use”).
233 See Satellite Navigation – NAS Implementation, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., http://
www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ato/service_units/tech
ops/navservices/gnss/nas/procedures/lpv/ [https://perma.cc/39UV-WT62]
(FAA guidance for establishing PinS).
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altitude altitudes to accomplish landings in very low visibility
conditions.234
Typical of these new types of helicopter approach and depar-
ture procedures are PinS. A PinS procedure has two segments, a
VFR segment and an IFR segment.235 On an approach, the IFR
segment guides the pilot to a point in space near the ground,
from which he can fly VFR to the landing zone—typically a heli-
port, but sometimes a conventional airport. Some PinS ap-
proaches support multiple helipads near each other.236
A significant number of helicopter accidents involve colliding
with obstacles fixed to the ground, what the FAA calls “con-
trolled flight into terrain” (CFIT).237 Some of these involve fly-
ing into the terrain itself, such as a hitting a mountain, a radio
tower, or a wind turbine. CFIT also involves misjudging the
length of the rotor blades of the length of the tail boom and
hitting a building or other obstruction with rotor tip or with the
tail rotor. Most involve colliding with wires, especially electric
transmission wires.238 Wires are largely invisible from the air un-
less the sunlight happens to hit them just right.239 Pilots must
avoid them by looking for the towers that support them and
making sure that they fly at a height higher than the top of the
tower.240
HEMS flights are especially vulnerable to wires because for
accident victim extraction, the pilot flies the helicopter into a
confined area not normally intended for helicopter landings.
Such areas often are surrounded by utility poles and associated
local electric distribution wires and telephone wires. Appropri-
ate safety protocols require first responders on the ground and
all personnel in the helicopter to assist the pilot in looking for
wires so he can avoid them.241
234 See HELICOPTER FLYING HANDBOOK, supra note 202, at 1-3 (discussing heli-
copter uses).
235 See Hickok Chart, supra note 232.
236 See Proposed Amendment of Class E Airspace for [Selected] Ohio Towns,
81 Fed. Reg. 66,221, 66,223–24 (proposed Sept. 27, 2016) (to be codified at 14
C.F.R. pt. 71).
237 See NTSB Blumen Report, supra note 196, at 14–15.
238 Stuart Lau, Helo Air Safety: A Plan for Reducing Wire Strike Accidents, PROF.
PILOT, Nov. 2012, at 84.
239 HELICOPTER FLYING HANDBOOK, supra note 202, at 13-6.
240 Id.
241 See Patrick Veillette, Wire Wary: What You Don’t See Can Kill, and Does, BUS. &
COM. AVIATION, Oct. 2015, at 24, 28.
2017] SURVIVING AN AIR AMBULANCE RIDE 121
Settling with power, or more formally “vortex ring state,” is a
condition in which a helicopter in a hover or in very low speed
flight begins to settle into its own rotor downwash, reducing the
effectiveness of the rotor.242 The faster it settles, the worse the
problem becomes. Once vortex ring state is fully developed, the
pilot cannot fly out of it simply by raising the collective.243 That
only makes the problem worse. He must quickly, while he still
has full lateral control, lower the collective and fly out of the
downwash forward or sideways.244 When fully developed, vortex
ring state produces descents of several thousand feet per minute
and also reduces lateral control.245 This can be disastrous for a
helicopter only a few hundred feet off the ground. Moreover, a
helicopter entering a confined accident site may not have room
to fly forward or sideways to get out of the condition.
Helicopters are complex machines comprising many parts
that can malfunction or fail. They are subjected to higher levels
of vibration than airplanes, and this increases the stress on com-
ponents. Design and manufacturing requirements mitigate risks
of failure by, among many other things, mandating safety wiring
of critical fasteners to control the effect of vibration. Pilot pref-
light inspections using manufacturer-provided checklists are
aimed at detecting component anomalies before takeoff. Pilot
training in emergency procedures stresses appropriate re-
sponses to different types of system failure, including engine
stoppages. Nevertheless, component failures occasionally occur
that are beyond a well-trained pilot’s capacity to recover from
them. Failure of a main rotor hub or separation of the tail boom
are examples. Nevertheless, unrecoverable system failures are
extremely rare. Effective pilot training and frequent proficiency
checks prevent most component failures from becoming
accidents.246
2. Risk-Reducing Technologies
Five basic variables influence suitability of a particular heli-
copter model for HEMS operations: (1) whether it has one en-
gine or two; (2) whether it is designed to be flown by one pilot
242 HELICOPTER FLYING HANDBOOK, supra note 202, at 11-9; see also J. GORDON
LEISHMAN, PRINCIPLES OF HELICOPTER AERODYNAMICS 252–57 (2d ed. 2006) (ex-
plaining the aerodynamics of vortex ring state).
243 HELICOPTER FLYING HANDBOOK, supra note 202, at 11-10.
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 Id. at 11-11, 11-16, 11-21–22, 13-7–8.
122 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [82
or by two; (3) whether it is capable of flight in IMC; (4) whether
it is equipped for NVG operation; and (5) its interior volume.247
Single pilot HEMS operation is challenging. The pilot must
keep his right hand on the cyclic stick throughout the flight,
unless the helicopter is equipped with an autopilot or some kind
of stabilization system,248 and most light helicopters are not. So
he has only his left hand for other tasks, and he must keep it on
or close to the collective stick at all times in case an engine fail-
ure occurs. Working radios to manage multiple frequencies to
communicate with air traffic control, ground units, and HEMS
dispatch is an important activity, as are other activities associated
with managing aircraft systems, searching for an elusive accident
scene, or referring to aeronautical charts and other navigational
aids. Watching outside the cockpit for other aircraft and obsta-
cles is another essential task that cannot be omitted for more
than a few seconds at a time, especially as the helicopter gets
closer to the ground. A professional pilot should have enough
mental and physical bandwidth to do all this, but he requires a
high level of training and must maintain proficiency in cockpit
resource management.249
A second crew member sitting in the left seat (helicopter pi-
lots in most helicopters sit in the right seat) is helpful.250 Even if
that crewmember is not a rated helicopter pilot, she can help
identify obstacles and help with navigation and manipulating
the radios. If the second crew member is a pilot, she obviously
can be even more helpful. She can fly the helicopter part of the
time and is more likely to have knowledge of aircraft systems
and aerodynamics to help the pilot monitor flight parameters
and deal with emergencies.
247 See Air Ambulance and Commercial Helicopter Operations, Part 91 Heli-
copter Operations, and Part 135 Aircraft Operations; Safety Initiatives and Mis-
cellaneous Amendments, 75 Fed. Reg. 62,640, 62,642 (proposed Oct. 12, 2010)
(to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 1, 91, 120, 135) (reviewing the common causes of
helicopter air ambulance accidents, including CFIT, loss of control, IIMC, and
poor night vision).
248 See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., NO. FAA-H-8083-25B, PI-
LOT’S HANDBOOK OF AERONAUTICAL KNOWLEDGE 2-27 (2016), https://www.faa
.gov/regulations_policies/handbooks_manuals/aviation/phak/media/pi-
lot_handbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/PGC5-JWGP] (“In a single-pilot environ-
ment, an autopilot system can greatly reduce workload”) [hereinafter PILOT’S
HANDBOOK OF AERONAUTICAL KNOWLEDGE].
249 See HELICOPTER FLYING HANDBOOK, supra note 202, at 14-1 to 14-18 (discuss-
ing “effective aeronautical decision-making”).
250 See PILOT’S HANDBOOK OF AERONAUTICAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note 248, at 2-2
to 2-4 (discussing crew resource management techniques).
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Some larger helicopters are certificated to require two pilots,
but light helicopters usually require only one pilot.251 Even in
single-pilot helicopters, however, a second pilot can occupy the
left seat, as long as the left seat exists and is accompanied by a
second set of controls. The problem, however, is that the config-
uration of most light HEMS helicopters places the patient
stretcher on the left side extending into the space where the left
seat otherwise would be, making it impossible to carry a second
pilot.252
As the number of HEMS operators increased, cost pressures
caused HEMS operators to shift from twin-engine helicopters to
single-engine helicopters.253 This gives rise to safety concerns,
not so much because engine failures in single-engine helicop-
ters are more serious, but because most single-engine helicop-
ters are not certificated to fly in IMC.254 As might be expected,
more capable HEMS helicopters cost more.255
In a twin-engine helicopter, the loss of one engine does not
necessitate an autorotation. Although the helicopter’s perform-
ance on one engine may be much degraded—it may not be able
to hover, climb, or maintain usual cruise speed—the pilot can
make a safe landing at a much wider range of alternative land-
ing sites than would be available in an autorotation.256
Some commentators argue that twin-engine helicopters
should be the norm for HEMS operations because they are
251 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-907, AIR AMBULANCE: EF-
FECTS OF INDUSTRY CHANGES ON SERVICES ARE UNCLEAR 4 (2010), http://www.gao
.gov/assets/320/310527.pdf [https://perma.cc/N26T-MU2H] (noting that most
air ambulances only carry a single pilot).
252 See id. at 16–17.
253 Veillette, How to Develop Helicopter-Centric IFR, supra note 214 (noting that
entry by more operators means fewer flights for each to cover fixed costs, result-
ing in higher costs per flight hour, causing operators to prefer VFR single-engine
helicopters over IFR twins).
254 See HELICOPTER FLYING HANDBOOK, supra note 202, at 12-4 to 12-5.
255 The Maryland State Police’s AW139 twin-engine, two-pilot aircraft capable
of carrying four patients and with advanced terrain-avoidance, NVG, and IFR sys-
tems costs $12.6 million. Maryland State Police Unveils New Medevac Helicopter, More
Coming, WBALTV (Oct. 5, 2012), http://www.wbaltv.com/news/maryland/Mary-
land-State-Police-unveils-new-Medevac-helicopter-more-coming/16869264
[https://perma.cc/9FGE-FRFR] (reporting on the Maryland State Police’s
purchase of an AW139 twin-engine HEMS helicopter with room for four patients
as the first of ten to upgrade its fleet). Single-engine, single-pilot AS350s are avail-
able on the used market for $1 to $2 million. See Eurocopter As 350B-3 Aircraft for
Sale, CONTROLLER, http://www.controller.com/listings/aircraft/for-sale/list/
?manu=eurocopter&mdltxt=as+350b-3 [https://perma.cc/4TA6-D686].
256 See HELICOPTER FLYING HANDBOOK, supra note 202, at 11-22.
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safer.257 But others disagree.258 The ongoing debate about the
relative safety of single-engine compared to twin-engine helicop-
ters is illustrated by the shifting position of Mercy Air Service, a
subsidiary of Air Methods, in obtaining, and then seeking to
modify, a contract to provide HEMS service for Kern County,
California.259 When it bid on the contract, Mercy Air empha-
sized the advantages of the twin-engine Bell 412 it proposed to
fly, arguing that it would be much safer and offer greater capac-
ity to provide for patient needs.260 It got the contract.261 Two
years later, because of high maintenance costs for the Bell 412
and the backup twin-engine Bell 222 and a general desire to
reduce costs, Mercy Air proposed to substitute a single engine
helicopter—an AS350— for the twin engine Bell 412.262 The
staff of the county legislative body embraced the proposal and
provided a variety of arguments supporting the proposition that
single-engine helicopters are just as safe, presumably based on
data supplied by air rescue: “No compelling evidence has been
found to indicate that a twin-engine helicopter is safer than a
single-engine helicopter. It would appear appropriate to dismiss
this factor as being irrelevant to the decision regarding Mercy
Air’s proposal.”263
Determining any objective truth is quite difficult, as it is in so
many other policy-sensitive statistical analyses. Most of the argu-
ments by knowledgeable observers are self-interested. HEMS op-
erators with a large number of twin-engine helicopters have an
incentive to distinguish themselves competitively by emphasiz-
ing—and exaggerating—the enhancements in safety and pa-
257 Abernethy, supra note 39 (arguing that most countries use mostly dual-en-
gine helicopters for HEMS, but that single-engine helicopters prevail in the U.S.
HEMS fleet); see also AIR AMBULANCE: EFFECTS OF INDUSTRY CHANGES ON SERVICES
ARE UNCLEAR, supra note 251, at 16 (questioning the ability of single-engine heli-
copters to provide adequate care when a patient’s lower body is adjacent to the
pilot, beyond effective reach of the medical team).
258 Thomas et al., supra note 93 (finding no consensus on relative safety of
single-engine, compared with twin-engine helicopters).
259 See Comparison and Analysis of Existing and Proposed Primary Air Ambulances
Used by Mercy Air Service in Kern County: Bell Helicopter (BHT) 412 and Eurocopter
AS350B3, DOCPLAYER (July 28, 2009) (discussion draft), http://docplayer.net/
10697742-Draft-comparison-and-analysis-of-existing-and-proposed-primary-air-am-
bulances-used-by-mercy-air-service-in-kern-county-draft.html [https://perma.cc/
4985-A68M] [hereinafter Kern Report].
260 Id. at 6–7 (quoting from Mercy Air’s October 2007 proposal).
261 Id.
262 Id. at 9–10 (explaining the motivation for the substitution).
263 Id. at 10.
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tient care made possible by twin-engine helicopters; operators
with fleets dominated by single-engine helicopters, or that want
to reduce cost by shifting their fleet toward single-engine heli-
copters, have an incentive to minimize the advantages of twin-
engine helicopters.
Some facts are undeniable, however. The probability of both
engines quitting is less than the probability of one quitting.
Twin-engine helicopters are far more likely to be certificated for
IFR.264
The FAA makes it very difficult to certify single-engine heli-
copters for IFR.265 The aircraft must require two pilots, which is
difficult or impossible to arrange in a single-engine helicopter
configured for HEMS, or it must have a stability augmentation
system, a kind of simplified autopilot.266 Few single-engine mod-
els are certificated for IFR, and therefore HEMS operators desir-
ing IFR capability must buy more expensive twins to achieve that
capability. A campaign is underway to persuade the FAA to mod-
ify its single-engine IFR certification requirements, but the effect
is uncertain.267
On the other hand, the greater complexity of two engines in-
creases the probability of some kind of malfunction. Moreover,
having two engines does not insulate the aircraft from fuel mis-
management. In a 2013 fatal accident, both engines of a twin-
engine helicopter flamed out due to fuel exhaustion.268
Most HEMS operators fly single-engine helicopters, and the
accident statistics show few accidents caused by engine failures.
In its 2014 annual report, Air Methods reported 248 single-en-
gine helicopters and 171 twin-engine helicopters.269 In 2007,
264 See generally James T. McKenna, Whither the Single-Engine IFR Helo?, ROTOR &
WING INT’L (June 1, 2015), http://www.aviationtoday.com/rw/issue/features/
Whither-the-Single-Engine-IFR-Helo_85138.html [https://perma.cc/24JK-9LJC].
265 See id.
266 See id.; HELICOPTER FLYING HANDBOOK, supra note 202, at 4-16 to 4-17 (ex-
plaining stability augmentation systems).
267 See McKenna, supra note 264 (explaining certification difficulty and the
campaign to make certification easier).
268 U.K. AIR ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATION BRANCH, AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT 3/
2015, REPORT ON THE ACCIDENT TO EUROCOPTER (DEUTSCHLAND) EC135 T2+, G-
SPAO GLASGOW CITY CENTRE, SCOTLAND ON 29 NOV. 2013 77–80 (2015), https://
assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5628ea4ded915d101e000008/3-2015_G-
SPAO.pdf [https://perma.cc/5Q9Z-JUZU] (analyzing sequence and concluding
that pilot did not attempt autorotation).
269 AIR METHODS CORP., 2014 ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K) at 13 (Feb. 27,
2015).
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43% of the HEMS fleet in the United States was single-engine.270
Moreover, twin-engine helicopters do not necessarily have larger
cabin volumes than single-engine helicopters.271
Night operations introduce additional risks because the pilot
cannot see landing areas and potential obstacles as well. If the
engine fails in a single-engine helicopter, he may not be able to
see safe landing area even if one is within the limited autorota-
tion radius. That is where NVG come in. If the pilot is wearing
NVG and the helicopter is equipped for NVG operation when
the engine failure occurs, he is in a much better position to
identify safe autorotative landing possibilities.
The NTSB recommended that the FAA require HEMS heli-
copters use NVG.272 According to a 2009 Forbes article, Air Meth-
ods began retrofitting its entire fleet with NVG and collision-
and obstacle-avoidance technology in 2006, at a cost of $100,000
per aircraft.273 In 2010, 195 of Air Methods’ 306 helicopters
were equipped with NVG.274 All of Air Evac Lifeteam’s, the in-
dustry’s number two operator, helicopters were equipped with
NVG.275 Industry number four PHI’s helicopters were all NVG
capable,276 as were number five Metro Aviation’s,277 and number
six Med Trans’s.278
HEMS pilots279 and HEMS safety experts280 say that NVG ma-
terially enhance safety for night operations. Data collected in
2015 by Ira Blumen, MD, showed that 90% of all HEMS helicop-
ters in the United States are equipped with NVG.281
270 Kern Report, supra note 259, at 13 (quoting the Atlas and Database of Air
Medical Services).
271 See AIR AMBULANCE: EFFECTS OF INDUSTRY CHANGES ON SERVICES ARE UN-
CLEAR, supra note 251, at 16 n.21 (comparing the AS350 with the AS355 and the
Bell 205 with the Bell 429); Thomas et al., supra note 93, at 64–65 (concluding
that single-engine helicopters have adequate space for medical crews to do an
effective job and that some singles are ergonomically better than some twins).
272 Sumwalt, supra note 181, at 18.
273 Burke, supra note 160.





279 Telephone Interview with Clayton Beckmann (Mar. 25, 2016) (“NVG is
amazing; it’s almost essential.”).
280 Telephone Interview with Ira Blumen, Professor of Medicine, Univ. of Chi.
Med. Ctr. (Mar. 25, 2016) (“NVG are huge; they are very important and long
overdue”).
281 Id.
2017] SURVIVING AN AIR AMBULANCE RIDE 127
Autopilots are less common on helicopters than on airplanes,
especially light helicopters.282 When installed, they can greatly
simplify basic flight tasks and navigation. Even the most basic
helicopter autopilots relieve the pilot of having to keep his right
hand on the cyclic stick all the time.283 Most can automatically
hold altitude and fly whatever heading the pilot specifies.284
Many can do more than that, accepting an entire flight plan—
including approach procedures—and flying that flight plan, de-
tecting arrival at waypoints, making appropriate turns and alti-
tude changes, and even flying most of the approach without
pilot intervention.285 With sophisticated autopilots, pilot respon-
sibility shifts away from hand-flying the helicopter toward moni-
toring autopilot performance.
Autopilots are not a regular feature of HEMS flying, although
basic autopilot capability is required for IFR flight in single-pilot
helicopters.286 New technologies are lighter and more capable,
enabling single-engine helicopters to be equipped to allow IFR
certification.287 If operators can prove to the FAA such improve-
ments allow for safe IFR operations with improved pilot cur-
rency training, new certification guidelines may be
implemented. The NTSB recommended that the FAA require
HEMS helicopters to be equipped with autopilots for single-pi-
lot operation.288 The FAA rejected the NTSB recommendation,
however, in the preamble to its new Subpart L: “Autopilot units
may be cost prohibitive and not widely available, and may pose
space and weight issues for helicopters not equipped to handle
the units.”289
Technology has greatly simplified aerial navigation, although
all pilots train to be able to navigate by combination of dead
282 See Ron Bower, No Hands, ROTOR & WING INT’L (Apr. 1, 2004), http://www
.rotorandwing.com/2004/04/01/no-hands/ [https://perma.cc/MUS4-ZRER].
283 See id.
284 HELICOPTER FLYING HANDBOOK, supra note 202, at 4-17.
285 Id.
286 See Veillette, How to Develop Helicopter-Centric IFR, supra note 214.
287 See Genesys Aerosystems Earns FAA STC to Retrofit HeliSAS in R66, VERTICAL
(Mar. 29, 2016), https://www.verticalmag.com/press-releases/genesys-aerosys-
tems-earns-faa-stc-for-helisas-stability-augmentation-and-autopilot-system/
[https://perma.cc/CV35-53ZX] (reporting on FAA certification of $71,509, fif-
teen-pound stability augmentation system with two-axis autopilot for Robinson
R66 and other light helicopters).
288 Sumwalt, supra note 181, at 18.
289 Helicopter Air Ambulance, Commercial Helicopter, and Part 91 Helicopter
Operations, 79 Fed. Reg. 9,932, 9,958 (Feb. 21, 2014) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R.
pts. 91, 120, 135).
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reckoning and ground references. Virtually every pilot flies with
a navigation application290 running on a tablet computer
strapped to his thigh. Such applications present aeronautical
charts in graphical form on the screen of the device and utilize
GPS signals to depict the position, direction of flight, altitude,
groundspeed of the helicopter, and many other navigation func-
tions.291 Increasingly, helicopters also have “glass panels”—large
video displays installed in the panel that display essentially the
same graphical information.292 Destinations can be entered ac-
cording to their latitude and longitude, easily obtainable from
any GPS device, and the applications can chart a course to such
points once entered, also providing the pilot with compass head-
ings to navigate to the point.293 The only important challenges
are to make sure the pilot is adequately trained to confidently
and quickly access the multiple layers of these computer applica-
tions, confidently and quickly and to assure reliability, either by
system design or by providing backups. The precision of in-
stalled GPS navigation systems can also be enhanced by a wide
area augmentation system (WAAS).294
Pilots usually control aircraft altitude by referring to a baro-
metric altimeter, an analog device that calculates altitude above
sea level by measuring the air pressure.295 Air pressure decreases
as altitude increases.296 Such altimeters can be standalone dis-
play devices, usually resembling a clock with a short hand indi-
cating thousands of feet and a long hand indicating hundreds of
feet, but they also can be sensors built into digital flight manage-
ment displays. For an altimeter to be accurate, it must be reset
periodically with changes in the sea level pressure as weather
290 One of the most popular is ForeFlight. See FOREFLIGHT, https://foref-
light.com/ [https://perma.cc/JMR7-D8LF].
291 See HELICOPTER FLYING HANDBOOK, supra note 202, at 14-7.
292 The Garmin G1000 is a popular example. See G1000, GARMIN, https://
buy.garmin.com/en-US/US/prod6420.html [https://perma.cc/SCQ4-59E3];
GARMIN, G1000: GUIDE FOR DESIGNATED PILOT EXAMINERS AND CERTIFIED FLIGHT
INSTRUCTORS (2004), https://www.faa.gov/training_testing/training/fits/gui-
dance/media/G1000.pdf [https://perma.cc/KM3U-T8V7].
293 See HELICOPTER FLYING HANDBOOK, supra note 202, at 12-5.
294 What Is WAAS?, GARMIN, http://www8.garmin.com/aboutGPS/waas.html
[https://perma.cc/7ZGU-4FZS] (explaining that WAAS enhances the accuracy
of GPS from fifteen meters to less than three meters).
295 PILOT’S HANDBOOK OF AERONAUTICAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note 248, at 8-3 to
8-4 (explaining how a barometric altimeter works).
296 Id. at 4-3.
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patterns and their associated pressure systems move across the
earth.297
For flights close to the ground, radio altimeters are preferable
because they use the basic principles of radar, bouncing radio or
sound signals off the ground and measuring the exact height by
determining how long it takes the pulses to return.298 The avia-
tion community believes that they are significant enhancers of
safety for low-level flights.299
Terrain avoidance warning systems (TAWS) reduce the risk of
collision with terrain and obstacles by warning the pilot of un-
safe proximity to either and in some cases automatically trigger-
ing aircraft maneuvers to avoid the risk.300 They typically work
by a combination of altitude information from barometric or
radio altimeters, GPS-derived position indication, and databases
of terrain and cultural features such as powerlines and wind tur-
bines.301 They sometimes also use forward-looking radar.302 Of
the types of equipment that can enhance HEMS safety, they are
the second-most expensive, after autopilots. Radio altimeters, in
contrast, have relatively modest costs.
Well-designed simulators allow pilots to experience all the
flight regimes of which a particular model of helicopter is capa-
ble without leaving the ground. The simulator replicates all of
the onboard electronics, provides visual information on a large
screen similar to what the pilot would see from the cockpit, and
replicates the feel of controls and the response to the aircraft to
control inputs. A simulator permits a pilot to practice basic
flight skills at a lower cost than actual flight would require, and
also permits him to perform emergency maneuvers such as
297 See id. at 8-4–8-5.
298 See Helicopter Air Ambulance, Commercial Helicopter, and Part 91 Heli-
copter Operations, 79 Fed. Reg. 9,932, 9,939 (Feb. 21, 2014) (to be codified at 14
C.F.R. pts. 91, 120, 135).
299 See id.
300 See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., ADVISORY CIRCULAR 25-23,
AIRWORTHINESS CRITERIA FOR THE INSTALLATION APPROVAL OF A TERRAIN AWARE-
NESS AND WARNING SYSTEM (TAWS) FOR PART 25 AIRPLANES 5–6 (May 22, 2000),
https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC25-23.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WM3V-8UE3].
301 See id. at 13–15.
302 See id. at 5–6.
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autorotations and recovery from vortex ring state close to the
ground without the hazards of actual flight.303
Importantly for purposes of enhancing HEMS safety, simula-
tors also permit practicing inadvertent entry into IMC.304 An in-
structor “riding” with the pilot in the simulator can trigger the
failure of various systems to give the pilot realistic experience
with sudden emergencies. Until recently, sophisticated simula-
tors for helicopters that faithfully replicate the performance and
feel of specific models of helicopter were not widely available.
Now, that has changed, although the acquisition cost remains
high.
“Generic” helicopter simulators are available for about
$120,000 and cost pilots slightly more than $100 per hour for
training time.305 These simulators are capable of simulating IFR
flight and have hundreds of published approach procedures in
their databases.306 They do not, however, replicate the dynamic
behavior of specific models of helicopters. The FAA cautions
that instrument proficiency depends upon intimate familiarity
with the behavior of specific types of helicopters and the instru-
mentation and automation systems installed on them.307 To get
that level of simulator training, a pilot must use a class D simula-
tor, which costs much more.308 In a class D simulator, however,
the FAA allows pilots to start earning time as if they were in the
actual helicopter.309 Flight Safety Foundation has been an ag-
gressive promoter of wider use of simulators in HEMS pilot
303 See, e.g., Professional Helicopter Simulator, FLYIT SIMULATORS, http://www.flyit
.com/professional-helicopter-simulator.html [https://perma.cc/G26Y-GMDU]
(describing the capabilities of the FLYIT Professional Helicopter Simulator).
304 See id.
305 See id. (The author took the parameters for monthly payments supplied by
the vendor ($2,280/month, sixty month loan, 5.9% interest rate) and used them
to calculate the initial loan amount: $118,500.).
306 See, e.g., id. (noting that users can select instrument panels for Robinson,
Bell, and other popular training-level helicopters).
307 See HELICOPTER FLYING HANDBOOK, supra note 202, at 14-8.
308 See Marcel Bernard, Real Learning Through Flight Simulation: The ABCs of
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training. It makes simulators available for an hourly fee.310 So do
helicopter manufacturers such as Airbus.311
The FARs impose three categories of operating rules on com-
mercial aircraft operators, depending on their size and the na-
ture of the operation. Part 91 contains basic rules for flight
profiles, equipment, and the type of rated pilot who must be
used.312 Part 91 contains the VFR and IFR requirements dis-
cussed in supra Section V.A.1.313 An operator-specific certificate
from the FAA is not required by Part 91.314 Part 135 applies to
most commercial operators who hold themselves out to the pub-
lic.315 It imposes additional requirements for organization, inter-
nal operating rules, and pilot proficiency checks, beyond those
required by Part 91.316 A Part 135 operator’s procedures must be
approved by the FAA for it to obtain and maintain its operating
certificate.317 Part 121 applies to scheduled operators—passen-
ger airlines and cargo carriers—flying larger aircraft.318 It im-
poses much more stringent requirements than Part 135 for
internal operating procedures and pilot training.319 Most HEMS
operators are covered by Part 135 when they have patients on
board and Part 91 when they do not.320
Safety regulation of HEMS is uneven. Medicare imposes al-
most no requirements on the types of equipment that must be
provided and defers largely to the states to set personnel qualifi-
cation requirements.321 States otherwise are preempted from im-
posing requirements on HEMS equipment, personnel, and
economics.322
310 See Professional Training Programs for Bell Helicopters, FLIGHT SAFETY IN’TL,
https://www.flightsafety.com/fs_service_aviation_training_aircraft.php?type=000
03&code=C [https://perma.cc/DA7A-KER8].
311 Simulator Training, AIRBUS HELICOPTERS, http://airbushelicoptersinc.com/
training/simulator_training.asp [https://perma.cc/VES3-FLDN].
312 See generally 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.1–.1609 (2016).
313 See id. §§ 91.151–.193.
314 See id. § 91.203.
315 See id. § 135.1.
316 See id.
317 See, e.g., id. § 135.325.
318 See id. § 121.1.
319 See, e.g., id. §§ 121.171–.207, 121.400–.427.
320 See id. §§ 135.601(a), (b)(1).
321 See Fee Schedule for Payment of Ambulance Services, supra note 66, at 9107
(explaining modification of the proposed rule to set the skill level of EMT-Basic
as whatever is required by state or local law).
322 See, e.g., Med-Trans Corp. v. Benton, 581 F. Supp. 2d 721, 740 (E.D.N.C.
2008) (“FAA preemption in the area of aviation safety is absolute.”).
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Until 2015, the FAA did not explicitly differentiate HEMS op-
erations from other commercial and air carrier operations.323
Then, in response to the poor safety record of HEMS operators
compared to the helicopter industry more generally, the FAA
tightened its operating rules for HEMS.324 It adopted a new Sub-
part L to Part 135 in the FARs, focused specifically on HEMS.325
Now, HEMS operations must be IFR-capable,326 and HEMS
helicopters must be equipped with terrain warning systems and
flight recorders.327 The new rules impose visibility and ceiling
restrictions more stringent than those for other VFR flights.328
HEMS flights can be dispatched only after an explicit risk assess-
ment by the pilot,329 backed up for larger operators with over-
sight by ground-based dispatch specialists.330
The new rules also impose tighter flight and duty time restric-
tions, permitting pilots to fly no more than eight hours per
day,331 with prescribed rest periods of at least ten hours before
each duty period332 and at least twenty-four hours off every
week.333 They prohibit assignments longer than seventy-two
hours.334 The new rules do not, however, impose any require-
ments with respect to aircraft, leaving to the operator to decide
when a twin-engine helicopter or two-pilot operation is man-
dated by safety considerations.
An additional measure of regulatory oversight results, how-
ever, from the FAA’s authority to approve or reject Part 135 and
Part 121 certificate applications.335 Direct air ambulance carri-
323 See 14 C.F.R. § 135.601.
324 See id. §§ 135.601–.621; FED. AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., ADVI-
SORY CIRCULAR 135-14B, HELICOPTER AIR AMBULANCE OPERATIONS (Mar. 26,
2015), http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/
AC_135-14B.pdf [https://perma.cc/TL7Z-V7MZ] (advisory circular explaining
the requirements of the new Subpart L of Part 135).
325 See HELICOPTER AIR AMBULANCE OPERATIONS, supra note 324.
326 14 C.F.R. § 135.603 (requiring HEMS pilots in command to hold instru-
ment ratings).
327 Id. §§ 135.605, .607 (requiring terrain avoidance and flight data recorders,
respectively).
328 See id. § 135.609.
329 Id. §§ 135.615–.617.
330 14 C.F.R. § 135.619 (requiring operations control centers).
331 Id. § 135.271(c).
332 Id. § 135.271(b).
333 See id. § 135.271(i) (requiring thirteen twenty-four-hour rest periods in
each calendar quarter).
334 See id. § 135.271(e).
335 See id. §§ 119.5(a), (b) (imposing requirement for “air carrier certificate”
for Part 121 operators and “operating certificate” for Part 135 operators); HELI-
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ers—those flying their own aircraft and pilots—must have Part
121 or Part 135 authority and also must have economic author-
ity as a specific carrier or be under a Part 298 air-taxi exemp-
tion.336 HEMS helicopters not carrying patients may, however,
be flown under the less stringent Part 91.337
Generally, Part 135 operators must have written operating
procedures that meet specified requirements,338 must employ
chief pilots and directors of operations meeting certain rating
and experience requirements,339 and must subject pilots to re-
current training and check rides at least annually.340 They must
have a certain number of aircraft dedicated to their opera-
tion,341 as opposed to leasing or renting them on a mission-by-
mission basis. The rules impose no requirements on aircraft
types, configurations, or capabilities except that they must meet
basic airworthiness requirements and certain basic equipment
for day, night, VFR, and IFR operations.
The HEMS Part 135 certification requirements are more strin-
gent. Applicants for certificates must demonstrate the suitability
of their helicopters and onboard equipment for HEMS and
show that they have appropriate inspection and maintenance
procedures for the type of operation involved.342 They must
demonstrate appropriate operating procedures, with special at-
tention to IIMC.343 They must provide details of their training
programs for flight crews. The FAA has published HAA-specific
training curriculum items for pilots and co-pilots.344
FAA pilot training requirements might not stress NVG and
IIMC training sufficiently. The emphasis in traditional IFR train-
ing or retraining is not on IIMC; it focuses on approaches,
holds, and simulated instrument failures for flights that inten-
COPTER AIR AMBULANCE OPERATIONS, supra note 324, at 43 (discussing FAA con-
siderations for HEMS helicopter equipment).
336 See Diederich, supra note 2, at 69 (summarizing regulatory requirements).
337 See Helicopter Air Ambulance, Commercial Helicopter, and Part 91 Heli-
copter Operations, 79 Fed. Reg. 9,932, 9,943–44 (Feb. 21, 2014) (to be codified
at 14 C.F.R. pts. 91, 120, 135) (explaining the relationship between Part 91 and
Part 135 flights).
338 14 C.F.R. §§ 135.21–.23.
339 Id. §§ 119.65–71.
340 Id. §§ 135.293, 299.
341 Id. § 135.25 (b) (requiring the exclusive use of at least one aircraft).
342 HELICOPTER AIR AMBULANCE OPERATIONS, supra note 324, at 12–13 (discuss-
ing additional equipment, inspection, and maintenance requirements).
343 Id. at 26–29 (suggesting specific operational procedures for IIMC, includ-
ing pre-planned coordination with ATC).
344 Id. at app. C.
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tionally occur in IMC for which the pilot has carefully pre-
pared.345 In the new Subpart L, section 135.603 requires that all
pilots in command (PICs) must be instrument rated, but not that
they be current, let alone proficient.346 Nothing in Subpart L
itself requires training in IIMC. The FAA Advisory Circular does
suggest IIMC training as part of operator-adopted curricula, to
be reviewed in conjunction with approving a HEMS Part 135
certificate.347 But IIMC is buried, as item twenty-two, on the sug-
gested qualification/proficiency check-ride list.348
It should not be too hard to add an IIMC task to training and
check-rides: prohibit the pilot from prepping IFR charts and set-
tings preflight; have the pilot fly a basically VFR mission; and
then, during some other demanding maneuver, like a pinnacle
or confined-area approach, flip down the hood.
The FAA Advisory Circular provides even less emphasis on
NVG training,349 presumably because Subpart L makes NVG op-
tional for HEMS. Contractual requirements that HEMS opera-
tions be accredited by the industry accrediting body
Commission on Accreditation of Medical Transport Systems
(CAMTS) and the accreditation standards of that body re-
present an additional source of safety requirements,350 but the
standards do little to extend the FAA requirements on the most
serious problems.
B. TOO MANY HELICOPTERS TRANSLATES
INTO MORE ACCIDENTS
The oversupply of their ambulances makes the inherent safety
problems worse in three ways. First, it puts pressure on operat-
ing and capital budgets to cover high fixed costs because utiliza-
tion is depressed. This discourages aggressive investment in
additional safety equipment and enhanced crew training. While
most air ambulance operators have gone beyond minimum FAA
requirements by equipping their helicopter and flight crews
with night vision equipment, they have not done the same with
345 See infra Section V.C (explaining why sudden entry into IMC raises risks
considerably).
346 See 14 C.F.R. § 135.603.
347 See HELICOPTER AIR AMBULANCE OPERATIONS, supra note 324, at 34–36.
348 See id. at app. C.
349 See id. at 27, 36.
350 See TENTH EDITION ACCREDITATION STANDARDS, supra note 193, at 5.4 (gen-
erally requiring IIMC recovery procedures and “encourag[ing]” IFR currency).
2017] SURVIVING AN AIR AMBULANCE RIDE 135
autopilots.351 Some people argue that a truly safe HEMS indus-
try would use two-pilot helicopters, which probably would mean
twin-engine helicopters.352 That would enormously increase cap-
ital costs for the industry. In fact, the trend is in the oppo-
site direction—toward more single-engine, single-pilot heli-
copters.353
It is undeniable that operators can cut costs by reducing ex-
penditures on safety.354 While they must incur certain mainte-
nance and pilot training expenses mandated by regulation, they
can cut safety costs in other ways. They must pay mechanics to
perform hundred-hour and annual inspections to accomplish
the work required by airworthiness directives and service bulle-
tins and to fix problems that make the helicopter unairworthy
according to its flight manuals. But they can perform mainte-
nance work with a well-developed and well-staffed in-house
maintenance department or save money by getting it done by
contract mechanics through a lowest-cost bidding process.
They can be similarly hard-eyed when it comes to pilot ex-
penses. They must do the recurrency training and testing re-
quired by Part 135, but there are many ways they can
economize. They can omit sending their newly hired their pilots
to factory training school355 and do the minimum in recurrent
training.
Second, the need to increase flight hours and revenue leads
to unsafe dispatching practices. Some observers and participants
report self-dispatching where an air ambulance operator
monitors emergency radio frequencies and, when it hears about
an automobile accident or other medical emergency, launches
351 See Adams, supra note 195 (evaluating recent technology upgrades to HEMS
providers’ helicopters but not mentioning autopilots).
352 See Abernethy, supra note 39 (suggesting that twin-engine helicopters are
superior to single engines).
353 See id. (“The use of small single engine helicopters is a rarity everywhere
except in the U.S. where these small helicopters compose over 90% of the cur-
rent corporate HEMS fleet.”).
354 They may rationalize greater expenditures on safety, even though it is not
in their best interest, by claiming that safety cuts would result in more accidents,
which would be bad for business.
355 The actual cost of Airbus transition training can exceed $12,000. See Ameri-
can Eurocopter 2010 Summary of Pilot Training Prices, AIRBUS HELICOPTERS, http://
airbushelicoptersinc.com/training/2010_Pilot_Price_List.pdf [https://perma
.cc/FK5Q-F3M6]. Particularly, if an operator has a high turnover of pilots, avoid-
ing this cost with respect to each pilot represents considerable savings.
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its helicopter without waiting for a request.356 The result may be
two or more air ambulances rushing to the same scene.357 More
generally, operators and crews feel pressure not to turn down a
flight on weather or mechanical grounds and therefore engage
in unsafe practices, particularly regarding the weather.358
Third, low utilization leads to low flight time for pilots, which
dogs their proficiency to deal with emergencies.
C. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SAFETY COMPLIANCE
The reality is that regulatory compliance always depends to
some extent on economics. Many and perhaps most rule viola-
tions go undetected and therefore unpunished. The FAA can
mandate pre-flight safety reviews and weather briefings, but it
cannot determine how seriously they are undertaken. It can of-
fer assistance to pilots who fly into unsafe weather, but it is diffi-
cult to ensure that the pilots will ask for help, given their fears
about damage to their reputations and status with their employ-
ers. To ask for ATC help in an IIMC situation is to admit a mis-
take, and no one likes to do that.359
The psychological forces are, for the most part, not external;
they are internal, growing out of pilot fears about job security.
No one reports any pressure on PICs to fly in bad weather. To
the contrary, pilots report many instances of turning down
flights and facing no repercussions. One pilot, who otherwise
was quite critical of his employer, said “they stress that even if
the weather is above minimums and forecast to stay that way, if
something you cannot articulate makes the hair stand up on the
back of your neck, you should turn down the flight. And they
mean it.”360
356 See Thomas et al., supra note 93, at 106 (discussing autolaunch, or the “dis-
patch of an aircraft based upon pre-EMS information, on the contingency that
HEMS will be needed”).
357 See id.
358 See discussion infra Section V.C
359 Cf. Marshall Allen, Why Doctors Stay Mum About Mistakes Their Colleagues
Make, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 8, 2013), https://www.propublica.org/article/why-doc-
tors-stay-mum-about-mistakes-their-colleagues-make [https://perma.cc/6LBV-
PYQ5] (reporting that physicians cover up other physicians’ mistakes); Marshall
B. Kapp, Legal Anxieties and Medical Mistakes: Barriers and Pretexts, 12 J. GEN. IN-
TERN. MED. 787, 787 (1997), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC14
97208/ [https://perma.cc/TXK3-MVL6] (reporting tendency of physicians to
cover up mistakes).
360 Confidential Telephone Interview with HEMS Pilot (Mar. 29, 2016).
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But the reality is that a pilot who is an outlier, turning down
more flights than his peers at a base, believes that he eventually
will be subjected to adverse employment action, whether or not
that is true. When everyone else is willing to fly, he is likely to
suppress his concerns and go along with the crowd.
Even stronger is the fear of adverse employment or regulatory
action, not because the pilot has made a conservative, safe deci-
sion, but because he has made a mistake undermining safety. He
accepts a flight and encounters deteriorating weather. If he
aborts the flight at that point, especially if he makes a precau-
tionary landing, he is going to have to explain what happened
and subject his decision-making to employer scrutiny. The em-
ployer may praise him for making a safe decision, but it may
criticize him and subject him to discipline for making an unsafe
decision—taking off in the first place in marginal weather.
Or, suppose he begins to fly into meteorological conditions
that obscure his visibility. If he follows the three Cs, declares an
emergency, and gets a clearance from ATC, then the employer
is likely to know about it and criticize him for not turning
around before he entered IIMC. The employer gets itself off the
hook and can brag about how its commitment to safety caused it
to discipline the pilot for making an unsafe decision.
If he presses on successfully in either scenario, he will not
open himself up to criticism. It is very difficult for any training
program to extinguish the natural instinct to cover up one’s mis-
takes. The stronger the safety culture, the stronger the instinct
to cover up.
The unfortunate part to this whole thought out plan . . . is, [the
pilot] would probably just opt to land at a suitable helipad or
open field (soccer, football, baseball field in town and open farm
field out of town). Then [he] would have less explaining to do to
the local FSDO [or, Flight Standards District Offices]. It
shouldn’t be part of [the] decisionmaking process, but in the
world we live in it is. I’m afraid that is part of the mentality of
professional helicopter pilots—the repercussions you face from
your employer and FAA. Maybe that’s part of the problem the
industry needs to address.361
361 Emails from Eliot O. Sprague, ENG Pilot, U.S. Helicopters Inc. (Mar. 28,
2016) (on file with author).
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D. UPPING THE SAFETY GAME
The accident rate cannot be reduced to zero, as much as peo-
ple would like to do so. Some activities are inherently danger-
ous—HEMS among them. At some point, safety regulation
encounters diminishing returns. At that point the marginal im-
provement in safety resulting from additional regulation is far
exceeded by the cost. Air ambulance accidents could be elimi-
nated altogether by eliminating air ambulances, but few people
advocate that approach. Excessive regulation, however, has that
effect. Layering more and more approval obstacles before a
flight can be launched eventually has the effect of eliminating
flights in conditions raising any question in the approval chain.
Getting approval for a night flight in less-than-perfect weather,
for example, could become so difficult that HEMS becomes a
daytime-only operation.
So the question is this: has the HEMS industry reached that
point? If it has, the best safety policy is simply to say, “We’ve
done the best we can; the rest of it is luck.”
But that point has not been reached. Fairly complete risk-
based assessments of IIMC risks in particular suggest that the
FAA has not done all that it can, and the following sections ex-
plain what else it should do.
The FAA embraces a regulatory culture in which it routinely
says to the aviation industry, “We have a problem. You guys go
work out the solution.”362 Then it puts together an advisory com-
mittee, and does not take further action until the advisory com-
mittee reaches consensus and presents a consensus
recommendation—often including the text of a rule.363 This ne-
gotiated rulemaking approach has many advantages, as this au-
thor argued in the late 1980s and early 1990s as negotiated
rulemaking became a topic of conversation among students of
the administrative agency process.364
But the track record for the HEMS industry is not good in this
regard. Relying on industry consensus and industry advisory
committees has resulted in protracted inaction in the face of
362 See, e.g., Helicopter Air Ambulance, Commercial Helicopter, and Part 91
Helicopter Operations, 79 Fed. Reg. 9,932, 9,935 (Feb. 21, 2014) (to be codified
at 14 C.F.R. pts. 91, 120, 135).
363 See id. at 9,934–35.
364 See generally Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Negotiated Rulemaking Before Federal Agencies:
Evaluation of Recommendations by the Administrative Conference of the United States, 74
GEO. L.J. 1625 (1986).
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continued high accident rates. The FAA’s process was so slow in
the face of an obvious safety crisis that Congress required it to
act.365 Subpart L is a major step forward, but it omits two key
recommendations from the NTSB and others: autopilots and
NVG capability. Further, it unaccountably keeps everyone in the
dark longer than is necessary by not implementing the statute’s
data reporting requirements.
1. Collect Data
The 2012 FAA Modernization and Revitalization Act requires
the FAA to collect data on HEMS accident history.366 The FAA
has not done it, and has not even issued a notice of proposed
rulemaking on the subject. It is not clear why this is the case. At
least some data should be readily available, and there is no ap-
parent reason why the FAA cannot issue an immediate mandate
for these data to be reported, subject to an exception process
which would delay implementation of the requirement for oper-
ators that can show concrete hardship.
2. Require Autopilots
The most important single thing that can be done to reduce
the exposure to IMC accidents is to require autopilot on HEMS
helicopters. Autopilots are available for virtually every type of
helicopter that flies as an air ambulance. Their vendors promote
them on the grounds that they enable a VFR flight to exit from
IMC safely by maintaining altitude and executing a controlled
turn. To be sure, equipping a VFR helicopter with an autopilot
does not result in it becoming certificated for IFR. Considerable
additional analysis and discussion between the FAA and the in-
dustry is necessary to ease the certification requirements for IFR
helicopters. But state-of-the-art autopilots are a step in the right
direction. Not only will they improve safety immediately, but a
program to equip a larger proportion of the HEMS fleet with
autopilots will increase pressure on the FAA and the industry to
resolve the question of single-engine helicopter IFR
certification.
365 See Helicopter Air Ambulance, Commercial Helicopter, and Part 91 Heli-
copter Operations, 79 Fed. Reg. at 9,936.
366 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-95, § 306, 126
Stat. 11, 60–61.
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3. Mandate IIMC Training
Training practices with respect to IIMC are unclear. Anecdo-
tal evidence suggests that Air Methods—and probably others—
do include intensive IIMC exposure as a part of their simulator
training.367 The rules368 and the CAMTS accreditation stan-
dards369 do not mandate it in sufficient detail, however. The cru-
cial requirement is that the pilot be able to recover from sudden
IIMC. The FAA could issue a mandate quickly, if not as an emer-
gency rule, then as an amendment to its Part 135 certification
guidance for HEMS operators.
Any IIMC training initiative also should consider the fre-
quency of recurrent training in light of reduced pilot profi-
ciency resulting from diminished flight hours. If the practice is
to do only annual recurrent training,370 its frequency should be
increased to twice annually, aligning it with the IFR proficiency
rule in the FARs.371 In other words, HEMS pilots would be re-
quired to undergo recurrent training as part of an enhanced
IFR proficiency check,372 regardless of how many IFR hours they
have flown in the preceding six months.
Pilots should be drilled on activating the autopilot whenever
flight conditions are less than good VFR. They should practice
triggering altitude control and command turns with minimal
fumbling. They should do it as quickly and automatically as they
do a handful of other helicopter emergency procedures pilots
train on, implanting their responses into muscle memory. Enlist-
ing the aid of an autopilot after IIMC should be as instinctive
and perfect as lowering the collective for an autorotation after a
power failure.
367 See Adams, supra note 195 (noting that PHI Air Medical requires training
for “management” of IIMC).
368 See 14 C.F.R. § 135.293(c) (2016) (requiring IIMC training for helicopter
pilots as part of the mandated annual recurrent check, but only in general
terms).
369 See TENTH EDITION ACCREDITATION STANDARDS, supra note 193, at 5.4 (gen-
erally requiring IIMC recovery procedures and “encouraging” IFR currency).
370 See 14 C.F.R. § 135.293 (requiring annual recurrent training).
371 The CAMTS rules already require this, but only for IFR operations. See
TENTH EDITION ACCREDITATION STANDARDS, supra note 193, at 5.6.
372 14 C.F.R. § 61.57(d) (stating requirements for instrument proficiency
check).
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4. Immunize Calling for Help
Section V.A observes that IIMC accidents continue to occur in
defiance of good safety practices. For some reason, pilots just do
not do what they are supposed to do. Section V.C offers the hy-
pothesis that pilots act unsafely when they inadvertently fly into
IMC because they are loath to admit a mistake.
The same section also acknowledges that new rules and proce-
dures have only a limited effect on actual behavior—the more
rules, the less the effect, probably. The proposed language set
forth below would give pilots and other crewmembers legal re-
course if they are in fact subject to sanctions for confessing their
mistakes with respect to IIMC. Providing the safe harbor is not a
complete answer to the psychological problem, but it should
help reduce it and encourage crewmembers to ask for help with
respect to IIMC.
FAA regulation also can help reduce the most serious safety
threat not already addressed: pilot reluctance to “fess up” to
weather mistakes. Pilots declaring IIMC emergencies and asking
ATC for assistance should be immunized from FAA enforce-
ment action. That would remove the fear that declaring an
emergency will lead to trouble with the FAA. A straightforward
way to do this is for the FAA to adopt the following rule immedi-
ately following the existing safe harbor for incidents reported to
the NTSB database:
§ 91.26 Part 135, Subpart L. Emergencies: Prohibition against
use declarations of emergency for enforcement purposes.
(a) Scope. This section applies to any pilot operating a flight
covered by Part 135, Subpart L.
(b) Immunity from enforcement. The Administrator of the FAA
will not use any declaration of an emergency under 14 C.F.R.
§ 91.3 requesting ATC assistance after an inadvertent flight into
IFR (or information derived therefrom) in any enforcement ac-
tion for enforcement concerning accidents or criminal offenses.
Adoption of the following addition to OSHA’s whistleblower
rules for aviation personnel would address pilot concern about
adverse employment action if he declares an emergency:
29 C.F.R. § 1979.102
(b) It is a violation of the Act for any air carrier or contractor or
subcontractor of an air carrier to intimidate, threaten, restrain,
coerce, blacklist, discharge or in any other manner discriminate
against any employee because the employee has:
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(5) Declared an emergency, as Pilot In Command, under 14
C.F.R. § 91.3, requesting ATC assistance after an inadvertent
flight into IFR in a flight covered by 14 C.F.R. Pt. 135, Subpart L.
Air ambulance operators are classified as air carriers under
Part 135; that is why regulation of entry and scope of operation
is preempted, as explained in Section V.A.2.373
VI. DEFLATING THE BUBBLE
The financial crisis in the HEMS industry represents a bubble
caused by the 2002 increase in reimbursement rates, especially
for rural HEMS service. The market will deflate the bubble if
Congress leaves the reimbursement formula alone. It should
leave it alone. The reimbursement crisis is the result of too
many air ambulances in places where they are not needed. The
market will be better at restoring a sustainable equilibrium of
supply and demand than any command-and-control regulation.
If democratic decision-making in certain areas of the country
concludes that more air ambulances are needed than the mar-
ket supports, local subsidies are better designed to meet local
needs than subsidies crafted in Washington as a part of the
Medicare program.
Preemption under the ADA is a distinct problem; it is not so
much a matter of healthcare policy as it is a distortion in avia-
tion policy. The policy goals and principles that led to enact-
ment of the ADA have nothing to do with air ambulances. The
HEMS industry is not an airline under any common sense of the
concept of an airline. There is no reason to distort health care
policy by treating it as such. There are, of course, health policy
aspects of freeing up state and local healthcare regulators to reg-
ulate air ambulances along with other types of healthcare ser-
vice. But the appropriate balance between federal and state
regulation of air ambulances presents the same issues for air am-
bulances as it does for other aspects of healthcare. The appro-
priate role of state healthcare regulators is a matter of general
healthcare policy, and not specific to the air ambulance
industry.
Important collateral benefits result both from letting the mar-
ket deflate the bubble and from freeing state and local govern-
ments to regulate the supply of air ambulances. Both initiatives
will encourage more partnerships between air ambulance com-
373 See, e.g., Med-Trans Corp. v. Benton, 581 F. Supp. 2d 721, 740 (E.D.N.C.
2008) (“FAA preemption in the area of aviation safety is absolute.”).
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panies and other kinds of healthcare providers—not likely forc-
ing a return to the hospital-based model, but newer hybrids.
Balance billing also is a separate issue. Just as the air ambu-
lance industry should not be singled out with respect to the bal-
ance between federal and state regulation, it should not be
singled out with respect to balance billing. Price discrimination
is common in all industries; it is likely to continue in the health-
care industry.
